

Volume XCVIII No. 4


March 30, 1973

40 cents

Commonweal

THE DEVALUED DOLLAR

RICHARD B. DU BOFF



SPRING-CLEANING IN IRELAND

JOHN COONEY

HISTORY IS BUNK

PETER STEINFELS

UNSELECTED SHORTS

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

SEXUALITY AND ADOLESCENTS

JOHN N. KOTRE

SHAW (IRWIN) & UPDIKE (JOHN)

ROBERT PHILLIPS

POST-CONCILIAR CATHOLICISM: ITALY

HENRY TEN KORTENAAR

NEWSPAPER NEWS

A-92540 12-73
ST CHARLES SEMINARY
LIBRARY
CARTHAGENA STATION
CELINA OH 45622



NEWS & VIEWS

Life Under Marcos

Letters from the Philippines continue to present a much grimmer picture of the situation there than do the obviously politic, if not censored news reports. Hence, from a priest in Hong Kong this peek into life under President Marcos:

"It has been almost three weeks since the last letter. On Jan. 29, two close friends were arrested [the names and religious orders of two priests follow]. These Filipino priests were arrested in their own religious houses, without formal charges, and brought to the military camp (Cramó) in Manila where they were kept incommunicado for two weeks. Their rooms and offices were searched, and they were questioned about groups they knew, 'safe houses,' etc. . . .

"The priests were made to sleep in the same quarters with prostitutes and drug addicts, at the same time being deprived of normal contact with fellow religious and even their blood relatives . . .

"I was able to meet these two priests just two months ago. Both had made the decision to give of themselves in whatever way they could to serve the cause of liberation and justice for the people. Both were brought to this commitment as priests—because they saw in this the total commitment which their priesthood represents to them.

"The government calls them subversives. Their arrest, their treatment indicates the nature of the government. It is obvious to those who know these priests that their work is for the people's rights. Their priesthood is honored. We, their friends, will not stop, but rather will be convinced of the reality of the struggle—and its value. Of course some of us might have to find a new place to

stay. The MetroCom (Manila special 'riot' police) likely has the names now of [the priests'] contacts and their addresses—and the military intelligence, too . . ."

The letter then turned to a detail of information which further points up U.S. complicity in Filipino events, thus adding substantiation to Gabriel Kolko's thesis in the Jan. 12 *Commonweal*. The letter goes on:

"Today's paper [Feb. 16] had a front-page article about U.S.-Filipino military units going to some remote barrios where 'insurgents' had been fighting before. The troops are said to be going for development and health projects. One commander is Filipino and the other commander is a U.S. military officer. We know, of course, that even the development programs have as their purpose to pacify the people, and to dampen their revolutionary spirit. In addition . . . we know that the military men use such projects as means of getting information about the people, about the guerrillas, and about ways and means of fighting against the 'insurgents' in any armed showdown. Imagine the boldness—to advertise the U.S.-Philippine military tie-up on the front page in such detail!!!"

Doctorates for Sale

Don't get too excited when you slit open that letter from Colorado State Christian College, read the flattery, and then learn that the College would like to award you an honorary degree. It's just the latest variation in the phony honorary-degree racket.

I received such a letter earlier this month. It informed that "a mutual friend" (whose name cannot be "divulged, for the simple reason that many [people] prefer to remain anonymous") had proposed that the College recognize my "achievements."

Milton K. Ozaki, Ms.D., Litt.D., who signs himself as president of Colorado State



Christian College, wrote that he had "personally reviewed some of the factors submitted" and felt that "our Board of Trustees would react favorably to your application for an honorary degree in Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Business Administration."

Being a person who cannot keep even a checkbook balanced, I found it a bit of shock to be offered an honorary degree in business administration. But the honorary-degree application generously provided for a possible unsuitability; it offered me alternative doctorates in science, letters, education or psychology.

There's just one hitch in this great triumph. I've got to pay. Minimum contribution: \$100 (tax deductible). Whereupon, Colorado State Christian College, the educational division of The Church of the Inner Power, Inc., will award the doctorate that will immediately rank me "with less than one-half of one-percent of all the people in the world," entitle me to wear the school cowl (crimson and azure blue), and signify to all and sundry that I am "a person of praiseworthy accomplishment." Hot dog.

In its solicitude for me and others it would honor, Colorado State Christian College "neither expects nor requires" the recipient of an honorary degree to come to Colorado to receive it. "It is clear that the average contributor would be subject to travel and housing expenses which might easily amount to more than his contribution," says the brochure. "The College, therefore, delivers most of the engrossed Certificates via the postal system."

For contributors of more

than \$5,000, however, the College will come to them and present the honorary degree locally, "providing the date of presentation does not conflict with major academic activity"—like, I suppose, banking day.

Odds and Ends

—The nuancing of language to reflect sharper gender sensitivities (the title Ms.; substitution of the word 'humankind' for 'mankind,' etc.) proceeds apace in medicine. In a *Washington Star-News* interview on life processes, Dr. Andre Hellegers of the Georgetown University Medical School rejects the word "insemination" as a "a pure agricultural term that implies that the seed is planted." One ought to talk, he comments, about "co-semination, or something that recognizes that the woman contributes an ovum."

—An unsigned review in *The New Republic* ascribes to John Cogley's book *Catholic America* a completeness that "perhaps makes small omissions more glaring." The reviewer thence tells of looking "in vain for any mention of the minor heresy of Father Leonard Keeney . . ." Which takes care of that bit of erudition.

—Bob Hoyt boasts in *The Critic* about the Rube Goldberg de-obfuscating machine he harbors in his Brooklyn home, and which he uses to counter the Vatican's da Vinci- and Cellini-model obfuscators. In one experiment, he fed the machine in a single batch the texts of *Rerum Novarum*, *Quadragesimo Anno*, *Mater et Magistra*, *Pacem in Terris* and *Populorum Progressio*. "After a lot of buzzing," Hoyt avers, "the machine dropped a bound volume of Michael Harrington's recent book *Socialism*, with a new preface signed by Karl Marx, new footnotes by Peter Maurin and Paul Goodman, and several appendices, among them one coauthored by Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden." JOHN DEEDY

CORRESPONDENCE



Abortion Ruling

Washington, D.C.

To the Editors: Robert Drinan's analysis of the Supreme Court opinion in *Wade* and *Bolton* is confused and confusing [Feb. 16]. The Court cites Drinan as a scholar who has defended the inviolability of the right to be born, yet it clearly rejects the validity of that right of the unborn in favor of the right of privacy of the woman.

Nonetheless, Father Drinan tells us "Blackmun does not, however, deny to the unborn all protection of the state." I guess the key word is "all," for Blackmun's opinion does deny the possibility of any legal protection prior to viability (24 to 28 weeks), and merely permits the states to provide some safeguards for "potential life" thereafter, so long as that "potential life" is clearly understood to be secondary to the convenience of the mother.

In contrast to Drinan's view, John Noonan holds that "there cannot be the slightest argument that for the first six to seven months of fetal existence, the Court has made abortion on demand a constitutional right. . . . Abortion after the first six or seven months has been effected by the Court through its denial of personhood to the viable fetus on the one hand, and through its broad definition of health on the other." If Blackmun does not deny all protection, he certainly does not establish any protection either. His greatest concession is to allow states some interest in potential life during the last ten weeks of pregnancy.

More difficult to understand, however, is Father Drinan's observation that "the Court has cracked down hard on any non-physician or de-licensed physician practicing abortion," and that "the medical profession is now the sole regulator of what standards should be followed by a physician who is requested to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester." What Father

(Continued on page 94)

NEWS & VIEWS: 74

EDITORIALS: 75

CORRESPONDENCE: 75

SPRING-CLEANING IN IRELAND: John Cooney 76

HISTORY IS BUNK: Peter Steinfelds 78

THE DEVALUED DOLLAR: Richard B. Du Boff 79

POST-CONCILIAR CATHOLICISM: ITALY: IMMOBILITY VS.

SPONTANEITY: Henry ten Kortenaar 84

THE SCREEN: Colin L. Westerbeck, Jr. 89

BOOKS: John N. Kotre, Robert Phillips 90

ILLUSTRATIONS: Front cover, top, Picha, The Special, Brussels; bottom, Rita Ham Corbin

JAMES O'GARA: Editor
RAYMOND A. SCHROTH: Associate Editor
PHILIP T. HARTUNG, COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.: Movies
BRIAN WICKER: Great Britain
HENRY TEN KORTENAAR: Rome
LOUIS MICHAEL COLONNESE: Latin America

JOHN DEEDY: Managing Editor

ANNE ROBERTSON: Editorial Assistant

JOHN FANDEL: Poetry

ALAIN WOODROW: Paris

JOHN HORGAN: Dublin

EDWARD S. SKILLIN: Publisher

JOHN BRUBAKER: Advertising Manager

COMMONWEAL A Weekly Review of Public Affairs, Literature and the Arts.

Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

Printed in the USA and published weekly,

except biweekly Christmas-New Year's and June to mid-September,
by Commonweal Publishing Co., 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016

Murray Hill 3-2042. Copyright © 1973 Commonweal Publishing Co., Inc.

US and Canada: \$14 a year. Foreign \$16. Single copies 40¢

DISAPPEARING ACT

We have been trying recently to look around New York City with new eyes. After all, we have it on the authority of the President of the United States that the worst of the urban problem is behind us, thanks to the accomplishments of his first term. And if you can't believe the President, whom can you believe? Speaking of America's cities in his series of messages on the State of the Union, Mr. Nixon said: "The hour of crisis is past. The Ship of State is back on an even keel, and we can put behind us the fear of capsizing." Ever since President Nixon delivered his remarks, therefore, we have tried to take a fresh look at things here with his reassurance in mind. Sad to say, though, we can't see any evidence to justify Mr. Nixon's urban euphoria. You'd still have to be an adventurer or an uncomprehending tourist to walk in Central Park at night, or down a good many of New York's darker streets, as far as that goes. If you have a family, even a small family, and need a decent place to live, forget it unless you can pay an arm and a leg. If the Harlem ghetto or Spanish Harlem has changed any, the difference escapes us. In various select sections of our city, whole blocks look more as if they'd been through a tough war than like parts of the modern metropolis they are supposed to be. The emergency rooms in the city's hospitals still get their regular quota of children who have been bitten by rats, and many streets have more pushers and addicts per square block than the suburbs have Good Humor men. In most countries children are the hope of the future, and they are here too, but half of our schools are closer to jungles than educational institutions. In recent years crime in these schools became so bad that guards had to be added; now there is a new problem, since it turns out that some of the newly hired guards are themselves wanted by the police.

That's what we saw when we looked around, and even allowing Mr. Nixon a little leeway for normal political rhetoric we can't see how he had the nerve to claim that his first four years have solved the worst aspects of the urban crisis. Further, we see no evidence at all to indicate that New York is much different on this score from other major cities. There are, of course, nice places to live in New York City, if you can afford them, and good schools for your children if you can pay the price. Thousands of tourists come here every year, and most of them have a nice enough time.

Commonweal: 75

But to suggest that the major problems in New York or any other great American city have been solved, or even begun to be solved, is to live in a world of fantasy. And this, we fear, is what Mr. Nixon is doing. First he creates a phony issue: for example, that previous Administrations believed complex social problems could be solved simply by hurling money at them, which is nonsense—no sensible person ever imagined this. The Neanderthal myth created, Mr. Nixon then compounds the foolishness by pretending that the problem in question will somehow disappear, not if weak programs are improved but if funds for correction are eliminated. The result: a government ruled by a spirit of wishing will make it so.

Well, it won't. What Mr. Nixon is trying to sell the nation is not a new and responsible, albeit conservative, approach to social problems; it is rather a flat abdication by the federal government of its responsibilities. And if any of our readers are even slightly tempted to buy the thesis that the worst of the urban crisis is behind us, we suggest just one day spent poking around an urban slum, in New York or any other American city. We don't know where the President gets his information on big cities and city problems, but we have no doubt that even one day thus spent in touch with the ugly urban reality will provide a sure cure for rose-colored Nixon-vision.



LYNCH SWEEPED OUT

SPRING-CLEANING IN IRELAND

Despite an appeal to the people of the Irish Republic to give him a "decisive mandate" to provide strong government in the Republic in a period which is expected to be of critical importance if peace is to be achieved in Northern Ireland, Mr. Jack Lynch, the Prime Minister of the Republic and the leader of the Fianna Fail party, was defeated by a national coalition of the Fine Gael and Labor parties in a general election which focused more on domestic social issues than on the framing of a policy to help stop the continued violence in the North. In one of the hardest fought elections in the fifty years' history of the Irish Republic the National Coalition won 73 seats (Fine Gael 54 and Labor 19); Fianna Fail 69 and Independents 2. The victory for the National Coalition ended 16 years of Fianna Fail supremacy.

The new Prime Minister, the Fine Gael leader, Mr. Liam Cosgrave, a 52-year-old solicitor and the son of William T. Cosgrave, the first head of the Irish Free State, 1922-32, has said that his first priority will be the tackling of economic problems such as inflation and unemployment. He also has the problem of coordinating the activities of a cabinet in which portfolios will be shared proportionate to their electoral strength between the Fine Gael and Labor Parties. The deputy Prime Minister is Mr. Brendan Corish, the Labor Party leader.

Mr. Cosgrave is a shy, awkward and unassuming man but he is also a politician of firm determination. Commentators in Dublin expect that he will run his cabinet as a headmaster does a school. He will let the bright boys have their say but nonetheless he will be the boss.

One of the main efforts of the changeover in government is that a number of talented members of the Fine Gael and Labor parties will have the opportunity

to exercise power. It has been generally admitted that Mr. Lynch's government had increasingly been a one-man show. Too many Fianna Fail ministers and deputies were of a low caliber. Their inferiority was exposed during the election campaign when the opposition candidates showed up the poverty of the government's policies. Men like Garret FitzGerald, who was the mastermind behind the 14-point social-economic program of the Coalition and a noted economist, and Conor Cruise O'Brien, the writer, professor and former United Nations representative in Katanga, will give a much needed boost to the machinery of government departments. It will amount to a government spring-cleaning.

In framing a program based on social and economic reform, for example, the removal of the European Economic Community's Value Added Tax from food prices, changes in estate duties, an increase in local authority housing and the reduction of rates, the coalition rightly sensed the mood of the country. The electorate was tired of increasing prices and growing unemployment. It was basically tired of 16 years of Fianna Fail rule and its system of patronage. It was time for a change.

A change of government had of course not been the purpose of Mr. Lynch's calling of a general election three weeks previously. His purpose had been to strengthen his minority government position so that he could act more resolutely in a period which would see the publication of the British government's White Paper on the future constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland. He was making the Northern Ireland situation the issue. As was the custom with the Fianna Fail party it did not offer the electorate any comprehensive program, preferring to stand on its record.

What at first was expected to be a one-horse race—

in fact the bookmakers would not take any bets on the outcome—became a hard struggle when the Fine Gael and Labor parties quickly allied with a coalition program. Rather than issue a counter-program Mr. Lynch and his party colleagues began by deriding the Coalition program.

Three things happened: first, concentration on the Coalition program showed its relevance to Irish society; second, negative criticism of the program by Fianna Fail wasted valuable election time; third, when in a last-minute volte face Fianna Fail started making lavish package promises, its credibility was badly damaged in the eyes of the electorate. The volte face of Finna Fail was a tacit but desperate admission that the North was not the election issue.

Ironically, it is the North that overhangs the Coalition as the major problem it may have to contend with. On conceding defeat Mr. Lynch urged Mr. Cosgrave to visit Mr. Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister, in London as soon as possible to discuss with him the contents of the British government's White Paper. In his policy towards the IRA Mr. Cosgrave is expected to be even firmer than Mr. Lynch. He continues the right-wing tradition of Fine Gael, the party which rigorously dealt with the IRA and Republican forces in the Civil War of 1922-23 following the gaining of independence from Britain. He will have the support of most of his party but there may be some Labor members such as Dr. David Thornley who may not be in agreement with an anti-Republican policy.

Defeat is a tragedy for Mr. Lynch. When the troubles broke out in the North in 1969, he had a difficult time controlling the response of several powerful ministers in his cabinet who supported a strong Republican party. When in 1970 it was discovered that some of these ministers were involved in giving support to IRA, he dismissed them. This was a brave move as among the ministers included were Charles Haughey, the Minister of Finance, and Neil Blaney, the Minister of Agriculture. A number of other ministers left the party along with Mr. Blaney but Mr. Haughey remained within the party.

Mr. Lynch was also accused of being slow in taking action against the IRA, especially the Provisional IRA. In his defense it might be argued that he was not sure whether he would have the support of the public for such an anti-Republican policy. However, late in 1972 he felt strong enough to pursue a hard-line policy against the IRA. Leading Provisional members, including the chief of staff, Sean MacStiofain, were arrested, convicted and imprisoned; the anti-IRA measures, the Offenses Against the State Act, was amended to ensure that suspected members of illegal organizations were convicted. Increasingly, in the eyes of the British and international public Mr. Lynch came to be seen as a statesman who could cooperate with British and North-

ern Ireland politicians in finding a solution for peace and justice in Northern Ireland.

In appealing to the electorate for support in the pursuance of this policy, Mr. Lynch, like many other politicians, has found that bread-and-butter issues have been more the preoccupation of the electorate than the issue of national security. Mr. Lynch has said that in opposition Fianna Fail will endeavor to defeat the National Coalition Government as quickly as possible. He has denied that there will be any recriminations within the Fianna Fail party because of its unexpected defeat.

However, it may be difficult for Mr. Lynch to keep his party in support of his moderate policy towards the North. There are voices who will now call for a return to the pure Republican gospel with its emphasis on a united Ireland. There may also be a challenge to Mr. Lynch's leadership of the party from Mr. Haughey who had a massive personal vote in his North Dublin constituency.

On the day on which Mr. Lynch announced the holding of the general election, it seemed that his return to power was certain and that he would take his place among the great Irish leaders. It is perhaps too early either to canonize him or to write his political obituary. But the democratic process has—temporarily at least—cast him aside.

In contrast, Liam Cosgrave, whose leadership of the Fine Gael party was in serious doubt before the election, now finds himself Prime Minister. Defeat would have meant instant political oblivion for him as party leader. Yet, like Richard Nixon, he has managed to survive and get office. He will have a more difficult time maintaining power than did Mr. Nixon. Admittedly he has a working majority, but he faces the problem of keeping together a shotgun coalition at a time when the Irish Republic faces great social and economic problems following its joining the Common Market. There is also Ulster.

His cabinet will bring about social change in the Republic, but there will be no revolution. Mr. Cosgrave is by temperament a conservative social reformer at most. He is also a conservative Catholic whose Pope is Pius and not John. He may personally be opposed to such social reforms as the legalization in the Republic of divorce and contraception, but he may have to bow on these issues to the liberal wing of the Fine Gael and Labor parties if he is to remain in power.

The only thing that is certain is that Mr. Cosgrave takes over the leadership of the Irish Republic at a crucial time both in the history of Ireland and of Anglo-Irish relations. The responsibility for the National Coalition's not becoming a mere caretaker government rests on his rounded shoulders.

JOHN COONEY

(John Cooney is a member of the staff of the Irish Times.)

THERE HAVE recently been complaints that young people are not sufficiently interested in history, that they feel the study of the past to be "irrelevant" and with no connection to the problems we face today.

Of course these young people are absolutely right.

Let me give you an example. I have wasted (as it turns out) a small but significant portion of my life studying the history of modern Germany. One of the most general conclusions of such study, reached by almost anyone who undertakes it for more than fifteen minutes, is that a nation can achieve the pinnacle of material, intellectual, and artistic civilization and yet, because of deep flaws in its political culture, perpetrate unthinkable evils. Obviously that is the kind of lesson which has no relevance to us. You can see how my time has been wasted.

But let me illustrate the matter in more detail. Students of German history are forced by their pedantic professors to pay attention to something known as the Prussian "Constitutional Crisis." This episode began in 1862 when the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, unhappy about King William I's proposed strengthening of the military and believing that the constitution meant what it said about the budget's having to be approved by the Chamber, refused to vote the funds the King's ministers requested. In turn, the feudal upper house, at the government's behest, threw out the Chamber's budget; and so there was no budget at all.

In a constitutional regime, one would think that the government would then have resubmitted a compromise to the Chamber or simply have abided by the Chamber's will. But constitutional theorists are never at a loss for cleverness. Those in Prussia pointed out that, yes, the constitution did seem to insist on the Chamber's approval for the budget, but on the other hand the constitution also gave the government

HISTORY IS BUNK

PETER STEINFELS

the right to collect the current taxes and duties until ordered otherwise. Therefore, a "gap" existed in the constitution; and necessity being the mother of invention for constitutional theorists as for everyone else, it was decided that in the unresolved situation created by the "gap," the necessity of maintaining the state implied the government could pretty much do what it pleased.

Such a conclusion was obviously not to everyone's taste, and in the midst of the resulting tumult, the King called a brash, 47-year-old nobleman, politician, and diplomat to head the government. This was Otto von Bismarck. (In the midst of this kind of useless study, it is nice to have a familiar personality on which to hang your hat.) Mr. Bismarck was not well received. He immediately defied the Chamber, proclaiming that power—blood and iron—would resolve the great questions of the day. The moderates and liberals replied that the legal and moral order was not violated with impunity. The historian Treitschke termed Bismarck's defiance a shallow and ridiculous vulgarity. But government without a budget continued.

Meanwhile, Bismarck dissolved the Chamber and called new elections. In the intervening period, when there was no Chamber to counter his moves, he attacked the press, obtaining a royal order allowing the suppression of critical newspapers. He further maligned his opponents as unpatriotic and even as traitors. When the elected deputies wished to question Bismarck about a semi-

secret agreement which allowed Russian troops to cross into Prussia to exterminate fugitive Polish rebels against the Czar, Bismarck refused even to explain his policy publicly.

By now, you must be convinced that none of these ridiculous goings-on has the slightest relevance to our own politics; but it is too late: you will have to hear the story out, so you will know exactly what we inflict upon our poor students.

None of these maneuvers—censorship, public disparagement of the character and loyalty of his opponents, and even intimidation through the courts—had obtained for Bismarck the pliable legislative majority which he desired. The constitutional crisis remained unresolved.

But Bismarck was to find the solution in international politics. He adroitly manipulated a series of international crises in a pyrotechnic display of diplomatics; waged two swift and successful wars, against Denmark and Austria; and successfully united all of northern Germany under the Prussian crown. He was the hero of the hour.


That part of the tale, I admit, possesses a certain melodrama, but now we descend to the truly dry-as-dust details: In the wake of his victory, Bismarck submitted to the Chamber an Indemnity Bill, legalizing his government's three years of illegal rule. Who could resist the successful Bismarck? Certainly not the German liberals. Had he not demonstrated that ruthlessness and toughness are crowned with success, whereas moral principles count for naught? Had he not stolen the cause of German unity from the liberals' own agenda, and even admitted the liberal principle of universal suffrage into the new constitution for the North German Confederation?

The liberals did more than vote Bismarck his indemnity. They fell over themselves to recant the naive and impractical ideals of their former liberalism. They learned a

(Continued on page 94)

THE DEVALUED DOLLAR

RICHARD B. DU BOFF



Basic economic and financial goals abroad remain unchanged

On February 12, for the second time in 14 months, the Nixon Administration officially devalued the dollar. The size of the cut was unexpectedly large—10 percent against most Western currencies and an effective 14 to 16 percent against the simultaneously revalued Japanese yen (not to mention European currencies now “floating” upward in relation to the dollar).

This sudden, and quite sharp, devaluation indicates that while the United States is altering its operating tactics in the international monetary arena, its basic economic and financial goals abroad stand unchanged. The February 12 decision was preceded, and is being followed, by a stream of threats from Washington, brandishing retaliation against any nation unwilling to give American products (in Nixon’s words) “a fair shake” in its markets. Our August-December 1971 surtax on foreign imports, the world has been informed, could be reintroduced, this time at levels exceeding the 1971 rate of 10 percent. Singled out for punishment would be those countries that enjoy a trade surplus with the United States and fail to offer us substantial tariff reductions and/or currency revaluations to decrease those surpluses. In all, the aim of the Nixon Administration remains exactly what it was in 1971: reconstitution of America’s big trade surpluses of the 1950s and early 1960s, margins of merchandise exports over imports great enough to pay for continuing foreign investment by U.S. corporations, overseas military expenditures by the Pentagon, and foreign “aid” activities by the State Department, the Agency for International Development and the CIA. These three foreign spending items—all

of which tend to create balance of payments deficits—supply the external muscle behind the Nixon Doctrine. They allow for maximization of U.S. influence in the internal affairs of other nations around the world while Washington lowers its visible military profile in Southeast Asia.

The Nixon Administration began to reformulate foreign trade policy as America’s large postwar export surpluses started to dwindle—in the first half of 1969. Almost at once the Department of Commerce set to work drafting ideas for expanding U.S. exports (tax incentives, easier export credits, stronger retaliation against any nation judged to be unfairly restricting American exports, expanded authority to hit back at countries which subsidize their own exports to the United States and to third countries). Speaking to the National Foreign Trade Council in New York in December 1969, Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans predicted an export surplus of only \$1 billion for 1970, an amount, he noted, far below the kind of net trade earnings the United States needs to finance its international outlays for defense, aid and investment. He called for fresh measures to restore America’s trade margin to at least \$5 billion annually by boosting merchandise exports from the 1969 level of \$37 billion to \$50 billion within three years.

Late in 1970 the Nixon Administration created a high-level White House Council on International Economic Policy under former Bell and Howell Company president Peter G. Peterson, as well as a 27-man Presidential Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy headed by IBM director Albert L. Williams. Working quickly, quietly, and with little public visibility, these two blue-ribbon groups turned out five volumes of hearings, statistics, conclusions and proposals.

RICHARD DU BOFF, a professor of economics at Bryn Mawr, is presently at the Institute of Social Studies in The Netherlands.

Commonweal: 79

The Williams Report, delivered to the White House one month before President Nixon dropped his "new economic policy" bombshell of August 15, 1971 (but embargoed for public release until September 13), traced out lines for increasing the sales of American goods abroad. It recommended controls on the domestic economy (wages in particular) to keep down the costs of U.S. exports, relaxation of antitrust laws to facilitate joint overseas marketing ventures, and generous tax and investment incentives for multinational business. Peterson's findings were submitted to the White House the following December 29. They largely echoed the Williams Report, and advocated "a clearer, more assertive version of new national interest," including reprisals in kind against nations that (according to us) cause "breaches" in the principle of nondiscriminatory trade. Peterson himself harbored admiration for "the miracle of Japan" and suggested that the United States might do well to copy some Japanese methods of government-business "cooperation."

Washington's single-minded intensity of purpose in trade policy was confirmed by Presidential Assistant for International Economic Affairs Peter Flanigan in a November 1972 interview with Hobart Rowen of *The Washington Post*. The American goal in forthcoming trade negotiations, Flanigan told Rowen, will be to improve our trade balance by no less than \$11 billion per year, or the equivalent of a 25 percent increase in our current annual export rate of \$43 billion. Correctly projecting a \$6 billion trade deficit for the year 1972, Flanigan then ticked off additional balance of payments deficit items, which he treated as given: net foreign investment of \$2 billion, \$3 billion for the military, \$4 billion for foreign aid, and a net tourism outflow of \$2 billion. In offset to this \$17 billion total, the United States for the moment could count only upon \$6 billion coming in as overseas investment income. Result: an \$11 billion payments deficit, to be eliminated via a foreign trade turnaround, *not* by cutbacks in foreign investment outlays, military spending or "aid."

Meanwhile, neither the U.S. balance of payments nor America's "allies" seemed to be responding properly to the December 18, 1971 dollar devaluation. The Nixon Administration was becoming increasingly frustrated, and it began contemplating a series of hard, new steps to reverse the unfavorable trends in international trade. On August 31, 1972 a high Administration source quoted the exasperated President as feeling that "our trading partners are turning out to be our trading competitors. . . . We can withstand a trade war better than any country in the world." The source added that "The President's patience has run out." (Four months later the citizens of Hanoi and Haiphong would likewise learn what it means to cross a man who "communicates the full extent of his anger" to adversaries who balk at giving him what he thinks he deserves.)

Before Mr. Nixon could act decisively in trade relations, however, he had to defuse the Vietnam war (if only temporarily), and by the time he managed to do that the 1973 monetary crisis had erupted. The initial reaction by the Administration was to practice Benign Neglect; the problem was dismissed as a European and Japanese one, not American. If foreigners were again being flooded with dollars, they could simply revalue their own currencies and throw open their doors to more U.S. exports. This (as I pointed out in these pages October 22, 1971) was what Nixon tried to pull off between August 15 and December 18, 1971—and failed. This time the road to dollar devaluation proved to be shorter and much more easily traveled. Nixon, George Shultz, Herbert Stein, Paul Volcker and Company had learned the lesson of 1971. Once faced with European and Japanese insistence that a devaluation of the dollar had to be part of any solution to the crisis that developed in January 1973, they quickly shifted gears and adopted more pragmatic tactics. The swift decision to devalue, announced in the evening of February 12, must be interpreted as a shrewd and formidable power play, a cold-blooded move to capitalize on an essentially weak position. "You want us to devalue? So be it. You say you'd like a 3 or 5 percent devaluation? Well, now hear this—10 percent."

European capitals, and Tokyo, duly voiced "satisfaction" and "appreciation," but such responses represent a mixture of immediate relief (the crisis could have lurched out of control) and longer-term whistling in the dark. The Europeans and Japanese undoubtedly realize that the 10 percent slash in the dollar corresponds with the rate that financial experts had calculated as necessary to generate a \$10 to \$12 billion improvement in the U.S. trade balance by 1975, and that 10 percent was precisely the rate chosen by Nixon. Nor can they be unaware that Washington still has no intention whatever of placing limits on the flow of American capital into key sectors of their own economies. In fact Mr. Nixon used the devaluation as an opportunity to urge elimination of all capital controls, including the interest equalization tax on purchases of foreign stocks and bonds and restrictions on business investments and bank lending abroad. This is a hazardous step for a nation with a balance of payments deficit since it could trigger further outflows of private capital—but it provides eloquent testimony to Nixon's real priorities. As *Le Figaro's* normally pro-U.S. Raymond Aron commented, "By what right, if not the right of the strongest, does the United States claim the privilege of a trade surplus in order to finance its external investments?"

Furthermore, the United States has now succeeded in jumping off to a head start in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) conference scheduled to open this coming September. Without giving anything in return, Washington will enter these trade discussions

30 March 1973: 80

in a "one-up" posture, having already benefited from an 18-percent devaluation of its dollar, plus revaluations of the yen and deutschmark, since December 18, 1971. With that *fait accompli* in its pocket, it will *then* commence "negotiations" with Japan, Canada and the European Economic Community (EEC).

New Trade War

Future trade negotiations, and international commerce in general, are headed into stormy seas. It would not be far-fetched to assert that a four-cornered trade war, among the United States, Canada, Japan and the EEC, has begun.

Though public awareness of it seems scant, the Nixon Administration began mounting a coordinated campaign of harassment against its major trading partners a year ago. On March 31, 1972 the Treasury Department warned foreign exporters that unless they raised the prices of their merchandise in the United States, presumably to reflect the monetary adjustments of December 18, 1971, they could be accused of making "sales at less than fair value" here, and hence of "dumping."

Economists usually find it an arduous and complex matter to make such determinations, but the Nixon Administration did not. On April 20, 1972 the U.S. Tariff Commission ruled that imports of heavy electrical transformers from Japan, Britain, France, Italy and Switzerland were "injuring domestic producers," clearing the way for the Treasury to impose antidumping duties. "The case involves a sizable amount of imports [\$11 million per year] and is one of the most controversial in the dumping area in many years," reported *The New York Times*. The next day Treasury made public two more findings of dumping, wire mesh for concrete reinforcement from Belgium and hand pallet trucks from France; both cases were handed over to the Tariff Commission for a determination as to whether U.S. industries had been harmed. On April 24 President Nixon hiked tariffs on imported ceramic dinnerware and related items—\$22 million worth in 1971—judged to be "injuring domestic producers of earthenware table articles." In May Treasury announced investigations into alleged dumping of sulphur and aluminum ingots from Canada; imports of the ingots alone totaled \$216 million in 1971, making this the second largest antidumping case ever looked into by the Treasury. A day later Treasury revealed that it was scrutinizing a whole series of Japanese government tax and other subsidies for exports of electronic products, with an eye toward putting "countervailing duties" on them. In June the Agriculture Department set forth details of new dairy-import quotas aimed at curbing rising imports of less expensive cheeses from 10 European countries and New Zealand; and Treasury stated that it was launching dumping inquiries into imports of hardwood craft pulp from Canada, cast-

iron soil pipe from Poland, dry cleaning machinery from West Germany, and zippers and permanent magnets from Japan. On August 3 Treasury charged Japan with dumping cadmium in the United States.


In a speech to the Federal Bar Association in Washington on September 14, the Treasury's chief trade official, Undersecretary Eugene T. Rossides, took "pride" in what had now become a record number of findings of foreign dumping in the U.S. market. Rejecting complaints that "more vigorous enforcement" of the antidumping laws signified "protectionism," Rossides went on to disclose that the Nixon Administration had investigated 62 antidumping cases in its first two years, a jump of 148 percent over the final two years of the Johnson Administration. In the past year alone, Rossides said, there were 16 actual findings of dumping, "an all-time record." "I anticipate," he concluded, "a continuing increase in the number of complaints filed under that [antidumping] act as American businessmen become more familiar with the statute and its administration."

Since Rossides' speech, the Treasury Department has started an antidumping investigation into imports of cold-rolled stainless steel from France, and last January 7, in a precedent-setting decision, it ruled that the Canadian government is unfairly subsidizing the manufacture of radial auto tires by Michelin in two Nova Scotia plants. Contending that the "substantial majority" of the plants' output is exported to this country, Treasury held that the subsidies to Michelin to locate in Nova Scotia in 1970 constituted "bounties or grants" to encourage exports. This marked the first time that any U.S. government agency had ever ruled that tax incentives and other grants to spur the development of new industries in poorer regions of a country were to be subject to penalty as unfair trade practice. If this were not enough, on February 20 Treasury formally accused Canada of dumping its aluminum ingots here. By now the suspect ingots are valued at \$350 million, making this potentially the largest dumping case in Treasury's history.

On top of all these steps, taken over the past year, Washington has continued to wage war, alternately hot and cold, against the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Instituted in 1962 as a uniform tariff wall round the EEC countries, CAP keeps prices of a major portion of incoming agricultural goods at a relatively high level by means of a "variable import levy." Higher—and protected—food prices inside the EEC, along with a system of subsidies and export rebates for some agricultural commodity producers, discriminate against U.S. farm exports, which is why CAP has been the hottest single dispute between the United States and the EEC since the latter's birth in 1958. Now, with EEC enlarged to take in Britain, Ireland and Denmark, the damage to American farm exports will certainly increase.

Japan's tariffs are another old grievance for U.S. exporters. The Japanese maintain thick import barriers against processed agricultural and food products, automobiles, paper, chemicals, iron and steel, and several kinds of U.S. industrial and mining equipment that otherwise might be competitive in their home market. Adding to the Americans' difficulties is the structure of the Japanese economy: it appears to leave little room for any sharp expansion of purchases from the West, since 80 percent of its imports are food and raw materials and its industries mirror rather than complement America's (and Europe's). Then too, Japan's own industrialists have profited from an array of export-promotion schemes, such as comparatively light social security charges and provision for "market cultivation" reserves that are allowed to accumulate tax-free. Since the U.S. trade deficit with Japan last year reached \$4.1 billion—two-thirds of its overall trade gap of \$6.3 billion—it is not hard to understand why Tokyo has so far borne the brunt of the "corrective actions" ordered by Nixon in the monetary and trade spheres since late 1971.

Still, it would be hasty to conclude that Washington's broadening trade offensive against Japan and the EEC



is "justified"—whatever that may mean in the context of a century of neomercantilist rivalry among capitalist nations. How much has the United States been throttled by its own growing inability to compete in world markets (a topic on which European and Japanese businessmen are outspoken)? How seriously have foreign tariffs really hurt U.S. exports? (Europeans, for instance, reply that despite CAP they remain the American farmer's best customer, taking a steady 23 percent of U.S. agricultural exports.) To what extent have "multinational" corporations—mainly American—been responsible for U.S. trade deficits? (Certain overseas affiliates of American firms themselves export part of their foreign production back to the United States; this is estimated to account for as much as one-fourth of total U.S. imports.)

Most importantly, hassles over CAP, regional common markets and trade distortion, Japanese tariffs and the like beg the question of *overall trade barriers* in the capitalist world. Most studies show that the nations with the highest effective rates of protection (in terms of

tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and other impediments to free and unhindered entry of foreign goods) are the United States and Japan. This country stands out as the worst offender in construction materials, textiles, electrical machinery, and aircraft and aeronautical equipment. Its "American selling price" basis of assessing duties on foreign chemicals has been a particular bone of contention between itself and the EEC since the early 1960s. In contrast to Japan and the United States, the EEC emerges as significantly less protectionist for the ensemble of goods internationally traded.

Moreover, when the Nixon Administration accuses Japan, the EEC and Canada of unfairly subsidizing exports, it ought to be reminded that a number of state governments in this country offer tax incentives and other subsidies to attract businesses that ultimately exports some of their output. Nor has the federal government itself been inactive in aiding U.S. exports. The Export-Import Bank has long furnished credit and risk guarantees for Americans doing business abroad and has made loans to foreigners to help them purchase U.S. goods. The avowedly export-promoting DISC (Domestic International Sales Corporation) program, passed in December 1971 as part of Nixon's "new economic policy," now authorizes U.S. companies to set up special export-sales dummy subsidies, half of whose profits are granted an indefinite deferral of their corporate income taxes. Since DISC came into existence, 3,500 U.S. corporations, among them virtually all the giants, have taken advantage of the law and reaped tax savings of \$150 million—and these figures are known to be rising rapidly.

It should come as no surprise, then, that the EEC has refused to take the American trade *Putsch* lying down. On February 14—two days after the latest dollar devaluation—the EEC Council agreed to take more meaningful actions against the DISC program, as an unfair export-promoting scheme that violates all existing international trade conventions. The first formal EEC protests against DISC were lodged in December 1971, at its birth, but Washington has yet to show the slightest inclination to discard this plum for its corporate business sector. In 1972, shortly after the Nixon Administration kicked off its anti-dumping" campaign, the EEC also struck back by raising import duties 11 percent on U.S. corn and levying its own "compensatory tax" on edible byproducts of pigs and chickens (\$40 million worth of U.S. exports to EEC per year). The Europeans have bluntly told Washington, finally, that its "anti-dumping" will be raised before the GATT meetings unless it ceases utilizing that law for covert protectionism or for "positions of strength" bargaining purposes.

For the Europeans (as the Vietnamese) are learning what it means to "negotiate" with the Americans. As the United States once again passes the hat among other nations for one-way commercial concessions to

reverse its trade balance, its "allies" may recall that in December and early 1972, after grueling give-and-take, the Nixon Administration obtained the agreement to devalue the dollar together with revaluations of German and Japanese currencies. Rather than requesting Congress to ratify the devaluation, the Administration waited some weeks and then sent its negotiators back to win another round of concessions (the identical tactic it would employ after peace was "at hand" in Vietnam nine months later). What Washington got was trivial—a few gains from the EEC on items like frozen orange juice—but it is resorting to the same high-handedness in the wake of its second devaluation. Whereas Undersecretary of the Treasury Volcker had promised French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that the United States would redefine the dollar in terms of gold, the Nixon Administration instead formally notified the International Monetary Fund of the 10 percent cut in terms of its paper "special drawing rights." While these may be hollow "victories" for Washington, they send the Europeans, the Japanese, and the Canadians an all-too-accurate message as to how faithfully the United States can be trusted to keep its word.

What complicates the trade picture further is the multilateral nature of the escalating conflict. Right now the Europeans are attempting to marshal their forces not only against the United States but Japan as well. In 1972 Japanese sales to the United States rose 18 percent, to \$9 billion, while shipments to Western Europe increased 40 percent, to nearly \$5 billion. As recently as 1967 the EEC enjoyed a \$46 million trade surplus with Japan; last year it contributed \$1 billion of Japan's total trade surplus of \$9 billion. Japanese exports to Europe are climbing steeply in the sensitive fields of automobiles, textiles, ship construction, cameras and home electronic equipment (including radios and television sets). In March 1973 the Dutch giant, Philips, will discontinue production of desktop calculators at its Bremen (West Germany) plant due to Japanese competition. Last January Britain's Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, hinted to Washington that perhaps the solution to the Nippon export blitz would be for both the EEC and the United States to gang up on Japan.

Of course the United States too has its hands full with the Japanese Challenge. Last August 30 Henry Kissinger, in Tokyo, warned Premier Kakuei Tanaka of economic warfare unless steps were taken soon to reduce his nation's fat trade surplus with America—but he also intimated to Japanese leaders that *they* should think about forging a common front with Washington against the EEC. With those flanks covered, the Nixon Administration might be in a better position to lay down the law to Canada, another trade deficit source for the United States (\$2.5 billion in 1972). But the Trudeau government, now dependent on the 31 left-wing New Democratic Party deputies for Parlia-

mentary survival, cannot afford to keep knuckling under to U.S. "antidumping" and "unfair export subsidy" pressure. Thus, citing possible oil shortages in Canada, Energy Minister Donald Macdonald announced on February 16 that effective March 1 shipments of Canadian crude to the United States will be placed under strict controls, reversing a 14-year-old policy of encouraging such exports and administering a body blow to Washington's dreams of a "continental" (U.S.-dominated) energy exploitation policy. Ottawa's decision may also imperil anticipated American access not only to oil fields in Alberta but to coveted petroleum and natural gas reserves discovered in Canada's northern and Arctic regions.

It is in this same light that one must examine President Nixon's "reconciliation" with China and the Soviet Union. He needs them as trade outlets (as well as counterweights against Japan, North Vietnam and each other). The comprehensive trade pact signed by Moscow and Washington last October might aid U.S. exports, since the Russians are becoming heavily dependent on Western industrial technology and supplies from American farms to fulfill their current five-year plan. The dependence of the United States on Russian purchases—and especially the promise of more in the future—is attested to by the unseemly haste and rampant corruption that characterized the billion dollar, 400 million bushel grain deal with the Soviet Union made public last July 8. Lately, Presidential Assistant Flanigan seized on the February 28 U.S.-Soviet trade conference in Washington to dramatize the need for more trade with the Soviet Union. Flanigan urged U.S. businessmen to back more favorable tariff treatment for the Russians: "We need your help and the help of Congress and the public at large if we're going to score as well as our competitors" in the contest for Soviet purchases. China too may help provide a small but important boost to the U.S. balance of payments, but as of now the Americans lag far behind the Japanese in this commercial race, just as they trail the EEC in sales to Russia.

Clearly, the hallmark of the emerging era of international politics—and trade—is multipolarity, a world of declining U.S. hegemony and new, constantly shifting alliances based on the way particular issues affect the ruling classes in the United States, Canada, Japan, Western Europe, and the leadership elites in the Communist nations. Who relishes these proliferating balance-of-power possibilities more than Nixon and Kissinger? Until now, nobody—but this can be expected to change. "Divide and conquer" is a game that more than one can play. And when several players go at it at once in the trade game, the field is likely to get dug up badly, to the detriment of all.

The fact is that Keynesian stabilization theory, or the conscious stimulating of spending to achieve full employment and social tranquillity within the frame-

work of private enterprise capitalism, has *reduced* the margin that political leaders have for maneuver—just the opposite of what liberals have been saying about it for the past three decades. The very existence of Keynesian concepts means that the socially acceptable level of unemployment in capitalist societies is much below what it used to be, and citizens have been conditioned to expect a decent showing from their government in keeping joblessness within bounds. But while capitalist governments are compelled to perform well in the employment field, the tools at their disposal are limited—and growing more so. Private investment can be stimulated by tax cuts, investment credits, and accelerated depreciation allowances, but at bottom the decisions here rest in private hands, not in those of the policymakers. Government spending can also be stepped up or down to counterbalance under- or over-employment, but there are obvious political restraints on flexibility in fiscal policy. Such government spending is diminishing in reliability as a counter-cyclical weapon,

according to EEC economist Michel Albert, who has found that as inflation becomes institutionalized and chronic in free market economies, government budgets undergo greater relative cutbacks as politicians look for the easiest methods for combating inflation.

Increasingly, then, in capitalist societies, featured by expanding corporate control over private investment, endemic inflation, and less public tolerance of unemployment, the only unfettered means available to governments to increase national income and employment is exports. There are, in other words, powerful incentives for each country to sell more than it buys in foreign trade, and by widening margins, as its integrative state apparatus searches for ways to attain full employment and keep the lid on social unrest at least domestic cost. It hardly takes a genius to predict what will happen when everybody tries to sell more when no one wants to buy. But such as the rationale of market capitalism in international trade today, and its costs will become more evident in the years ahead.

POST-CONCILIAR CATHOLICISM: ITALY

IMMOBILITY VS. SPONTANEITY

HENRY TEN KORTENAAR

"There is a history of popular Christianity in Italy which does not coincide with that of the hierarchy. Since it is not always expressed in books, even lay people do not know it. This is why so many wonder where Pope John came from, with that zest and style of his."

(Silone, *L'avventura d'un povero cristiano*, p. 11)

Italian Catholicism is undoubtedly changing, but how much of this is due to the Council and how much to other, external factors, it is hard to say. The old patterns of social life have survived here longer than elsewhere and the switch from a predominantly agricultural society to a modern industrial one has been more sudden and violent. Unfortunately, the profound cultural change brought about by this process is not reflected in the country's political and ecclesiastical structures, and the discrepancy causes an ever growing friction.

Ever since the legendary "donation of Constantine" the Church has been a power among other powers in Italy. Up to 1870 it was even a state, often at war

with other states, and more formidable than all of them, since it could (and did) use spiritual arms, such as excommunications and interdicts, in order to achieve its worldly aims. During the *Risorgimento*, the movement for national unity, Catholics had to choose between their country and the Church, and the clash of loyalties became even more acute when in 1870 the Italian troops conquered the Papal States. This event was the beginning of the "Roman question," which dominated the country's history until 1929, when it was brought to an end by Mussolini, that "man of Providence," (as Pope Pius XI called him).

The Lateran Treaty and the Concordat restored the Church to a position of absolute privilege within the Italian society. It used this position to the full, but inevitably got used in its turn. Since the established order was where its (huge) interests lay, it was turned into a defender and pillar of that order, an *instrumentum regni*. The agreement of mutual assistance between the ecclesiastical and political power became even more cordial after the war, as the ways of using each other could be subtler and more profitable under a Catholic government than under the arrogant fascist regime. An

HENRY TEN KORTENAAR is Commonweal's correspondent in Italy.

30 March 1973: 84

unprecedented flowering of Catholic organizations, hospitals, schools, churches and seminaries was the grateful return for the unconditional support of the Church authorities, from the highest to the lowest, for the party and the government.

It would be impossible to understand the present situation of Italian Catholicism without taking into account the Church's position as a political and economic power in the nation. Like any other human institution it obeys strict sociological laws of self-preservation and resistance to violent change, made even more inexorable by its religious motivations: its right to possess and to rule is God-given, and so is its rigid hierarchical structure, with its special relation to the Pope, who (this is another distinctive trait) is not only head of the universal church, but also, as Bishop of Rome, primate of the Italian Church. With these facts in mind, one can only expect that immobility, conformity to the "party-line," fear of originality and other ills of an authoritarian church will be more heavily felt here than in other countries.

Nor is it surprising to find that the feelings of the Italians towards the Church are extremely ambivalent, and that the dividing line between adherents and opponents has very little relation with belief or unbelief. This is what makes it so hard to answer the question: how many Catholics are there in Italy? Officially all Italians are Catholic; by law "the Catholic apostolic and Roman religion is the only religion of the State." This fiction is kept up by Church authorities, and each pastor must consider all inhabitants of his parish as parishioners. In fact, almost nobody will shut the door in his face when he comes for the Easter-blessing and (according to a 1969 study of the Gregorian University, held in Rome) 96.4 percent have their children baptized, 99.4 percent have received First Communion, 91.4 percent want a religious funeral. But how much of this is due to habit, social pressure, etc., and how much to conviction, in most cases he will never know.

In most other places a person who no longer believes in the Church and its teaching, or who rejects its methods, will leave it; the Italian will do no such thing. There are, it is true, 300,000 Protestants and (according to sociologist Silvano Burgalassi) some 5 percent of the Italians (and more than 20 percent of the college population) who declare themselves to be atheists; but where does that get us if we hear that among more or less regular churchgoers in Rome 4 percent do not believe in God's existence (and, speaking of ecclesiastical dogmas, more than 60 percent do not admit papal infallibility, which on the other hand is accepted by 7.5 percent of those who *never* go to church)?

One thing is certain: 55-60 percent of the population have lost all interest in the Church, but most of them will go on performing a few religious formalities, such as baptisms and marriages. To my knowledge, no sociologist has yet inquired how many Italians have

their doubts about God, but blindly trust in St. Anthony. The Church itself continues to countenance some exceedingly strange beliefs; I often wonder whether Msgr. Capovilla, Pope John's secretary, who from Archbishop of Chieti was promoted away to the sanctuary of Loreto, is required to believe in the story of the house of Nazareth being flown in from Palestine by angels (the extraordinary feat earned the Madonna of Loreto the title of patron-saint of the Italian Air Force). The clergy has long tolerated, and often participated in, the strangest magical rites of the "simple faithful"; when this year, at last, the bishops of Campania forbade the barbarous jumping and shouting procession to the Madonna of the Arch, the Dominicans who run the sanctuary quietly received the 30,000 delirious pilgrims and pocketed the money pinned to the dresses of the various statues which came dancing in.

Secularization

More than the slowly changing attitude of Church authorities, the progressive secularization of Italian society, aggravated by the huge migration movement from rural areas to the cities, and from the underdeveloped South to Northern Italy and abroad (in 10 years 15 million Italians have left their villages to seek work elsewhere), will rob this category of "simple faithful" of what little religion they have left. "The industrialization and urbanization," writes Fr. De Rosa S.J., "have not created, but only revealed and aggravated a religious crisis which already existed. They have revealed that the religion experienced before the big migration from the countryside to the factory and from the village to the city was based more on cultural structures than on faith, more on . . . traditions than on a personal relationship with Christ."

The crisis revealed by the social change is not only religious, but also cultural—for the city Church the immigrants find, though less archaic than the one they have left, is not better equipped to guide their integration in the modern city to which it is a stranger itself. It, too, is linked to cultural structures of the past, as is shown by the pseudo-baroque concrete domes of many "modern" churches. The culture of the new Italy has developed in the last hundred years without, or even against, the Church. In this century it has been dominated by the liberal philosopher Croce and the Marxist Gramsci, but there has been no significant Catholic contribution; the few timid stirrings at the beginning of the century were mercilessly quenched by the anti-Modernist hurricane. It is revealing that today even the relevant religious preoccupations are expressed outside the Church: by writers like Silone, film-makers like Pasolini and Cavani, artists like Manzù, to cite only a few.

For this reason 43 years of compulsory religious train-

ing in all schools, private and public, prescribed by the Concordat, has had no effect. Today everybody agrees that the religious ignorance of the Italians is "enormous," and in their June 1972 meeting the bishops have decided upon a three-year program of "evangelization." But *whom* are they going to evangelize? The 28 percent who still go to Church? (The figure is the only one available, and comparisons with the past are impossible.) Out of every hundred Italians in Church on any given Sunday, there are 41 under 17, 20 adult women, 8 adult men and the other 31 are persons over 61: a church of children, women and old people.

And *who* will evangelize them? Less than 10 percent of the clergy have accomplished their studies during or after the Council (and 50-70 percent read one book or magazine a year; 10-15 percent never read anything at all). Their number has steadily decreased in the last 90 years: in 1881 there were 84,834 secular priests in a population of 28 million; today there are 42,667 in 55 million. Their average age, which in 1911 was 46, is now around 60, and according to a study of the Jesuit magazine *Aggiornamenti Sociali* the number of priests over 75 will soon be 25 percent (in the unlikely case that all present trends—number of deaths, new ordinations, those who leave the priesthood—remain constant).

What answer could this Church give to the challenge of Vatican II? The beginning of the Council found the bishops totally unprepared and the faithful as completely uninterested. Those who were in Italy at the time will remember the striking contrast between the excitement in the rest of the world and the absolute indifference of the Italians. To the bishops the glittering opening ceremony seemed to promise one of those triumphant celebrations of the Church's power which had always been dear to their hearts—and the new problems raised by the "foreigners," as well as their unheard-of irreverent methods, left them aghast. They were unable to recognize the "world" their colleagues spoke of—it should be remembered that there are 290 Italian bishops (the world's largest national episcopate), most of them heads of minute rural dioceses, but even those who governed large urban agglomerations had been used to looking upon the changes going on under their palace windows in terms of sin and worldliness which should be fought by the traditional means of teaching and preaching.

As the Council went on, they got more and more impatient to have the foreigners out of the way and get back to business. However, they faithfully implemented the Council's prescriptions, as far as they contained clear norms; a typical description of their task was given by Cardinal Ottaviani who saw himself as a "policeman who keeps watch on the new gold reserve of the Church, just as he had kept watch on the old." They were among the first to have the entire new liturgy translated and

published in new liturgical books, as final and definite as the old ones—a new set of rubrics to be applied, a point of arrival rather than of departure. The institution of a National Bishops' Conference became a test-case for the Roman interpretation of the local autonomy and the episcopal collegiality advocated by the Council. It is now clear that the Italian bishops are a good deal less free than they were before, closely controlled as they are by a centralized bureaucracy. A little more attention to the Italian experience might have made some foreign bishops less sanguine in their hopes for the second Synod (where collegiality was discussed).

In the Diocese


At the diocesan level the trend is not different. In Milan a diocesan synod was held from 1966 to 1972; the almost 2,000 diocesan priests were twice invited to assist: at the opening and closing ceremonies. In 1969 they were asked to give their opinion on the first draft of a synod document, which was rejected by a large majority. In January of this year they received the final document, containing 412 articles "which will rule the religious life of the faithful in Milan": it was substantially identical with the rejected text. The interest shown by some lay groups in the synod led to the indefinite postponement of the institution of a pastoral council.

Yet Milan is considered the "pilot-diocese" of conciliar renewal. It is both the largest (pop. 4½ million) and traditionally one of the best organized and most flourishing dioceses; it is also more directly than most in touch with modern industrial society. After the Council, Cardinal Colombo (69, of which 51 years were spent in the seminary) said: "The whole Christian world of Vatican II looks at Milan, as in the days of St. Charles Borromeo and the Council of Trent." The Christian world may not have been aware of this, but it saved Milan the trouble of looking elsewhere for new models. Since the old structures were good enough, the only concern was that there were not enough of them, and the diocese embarked upon a gigantic program of church-building. Each year ten new parish churches arise in the outer districts, though the working class population does not seem anxious to use them (in some of these parishes less than 10 percent go to church, in one, 1,700 out of 23,000). Despite its impressive outward presence, the Church seems fatally condemned to an increasingly marginal existence in the growing city. Its critical function is exercised within the framework of the existing order (insistence on sexual morality, etc.), but leaves its foundations and radical injustices untouched.

The clerical personnel is still sufficient to man the organization, but the seminary population (minor and major seminaries) has fallen down from 1,500 in 1964

to 750 in 1970, and since 1968 those who leave outnumber the new recruits. In the theology course, where the dropout rate was practically zero until the early sixties, it has now risen to over 40 percent and, if the present trend continues, is expected to reach 85 percent in the present student generation. Those who survive find themselves at ease in a diocese which is run like one huge seminary.

Docility is in this view the essential quality required of priests and laity alike. This explains the growing losses of candidates to the priesthood in the last years before ordination. Another striking illustration is given by Buralassi, who in 1968 interviewed 218 priests, indicated by their bishops as the most creative, original and dynamic subjects of their dioceses. Two years later



he wrote them again, and 47 (almost 25 percent) answered they had left the priesthood. Compared to the national average, which official sources claim to be 0.85 percent (though this is too optimistic, for it does not consider the regular clergy, and leaves out of account those who leave without official permission), this figure shows that it is precisely the creative top which is cut off by the prevailing official policy. The bishops, too, are expected to be docile, and the few who are not (such as Cardinal Pellegrino of Turin) find themselves painfully isolated within the Episcopal Conference.

The diocese of Turin shows that there are other possibilities in the Italian Church. It, too, is a large industrial city with enormous unresolved problems caused by mass immigration, radicalization of the labor forces, etc. It has a long tradition of mutual support between the Church and the centers of political and economical power, the Savoia dynasty in the past, that of the Agnelli (owners of the FIAT automobile industry) today. Since the war there has been a growing opposition against this triple alliance of throne, factory and altar—first by individuals, later by groups of various extractions: Christian labor movement, students, priest-workers etc. But it was not until the arrival of the new Archbishop that the diocese itself got involved in the renewal movement.

Michele Pellegrino, 68, a former professor of church history, cannot be described as a progressive, but he is

willing to listen and open to new solutions. His is the only diocese where a group of priest-workers has an explicit mandate from their bishop (all the others—80 out of more than 40,000 secular priests—are either tolerated or totally ignored by the local churches). One of them is head of the diocesan office for pastoral labor problems and the author of the first draft of a program of pastoral renewal, which was thoroughly studied and discussed at all diocesan levels. Finally it was presented by the Cardinal under the title "*Caminare Insieme*" ("Going Forward Together"). The keywords of the program are "poverty," "freedom" and "brotherhood"—three fashionable words, but extremely unpopular in their concrete applications.

For the first time an official ecclesiastical document proposes the "choice of (the working) class" as a necessity for the Church, and consequently the "ceasing of all relations of privilege with the wealthy classes." It met with open hostility on the part of some older priests and of all local potentates, but was received with enthusiasm by the majority of the diocese (and by many Catholics outside Turin). The model of a Church which, renouncing its privileges, puts itself with simple solidarity on the side of the poor and the underprivileged, is symbolized by the barrack churches in some new districts and by the action of one parish (or rather, local community which has its center in the parish buildings), which successfully prevented the construction of a huge new apartment building on the last remaining site of a district still without schools, playgrounds and other community services.

The Turin diocese is not the Italian Church of the future, but it is moving towards that future and no longer exclusively preoccupied with past history and present power. And it is "going forward together," no longer in scattered little groups. In this sense it may become a model for the rest of the Church in Italy.

Another Side

It should not be imagined, however, that the immobility of the official Church is characteristic of the whole of Italian Catholicism. The ills of a Church encumbered by the weight of its power and privileges have long been denounced by courageous individuals, and today by an ever growing number of so-called "spontaneous groups." One of the precursors is the lonely prophetic figure of Primo Mazzolari (1890-1959), priest, anti-fascist, partisan and preacher (long before the Council) of the "Church of the poor." Another example is Lorenzo Milani, who died a few years ago at the age of 44, as pastor of a mountain village of 90 inhabitants, exiled by his bishop, Cardinal Florit of Florence. As a young assistant he had found, to his dismay, that a Church, which protected the rich and was protected by them, was unable to preach the

Gospel to the poor. In an ingenuous and beautiful book he described his pastoral experiences, ending in a letter to imaginary Chinese missionaries of the 3d millennium: "You will not understand why before our fall we have not put the ax to the root of social injustice. We were blinded by our love of 'order' . . . We have not hated the poor, as history will say of us. We have only slept . . . When we woke up, it was too late. The poor had left without us." His last years were exclusively dedicated to teaching his villagers; his methods are now followed by many groups, in the slum districts of the cities and in the villages of the South.

Today these ideas no longer belong to a few individuals, but to large groups and entire communities in search of a new religiosity. This is a new phenomenon which, if not started, was certainly stimulated by the Council. Many groups started with bible study, liturgy, etc., but soon discovered the social and political dimensions of the Gospel message. They move in different directions and can in no way be described as an organized movement. Broadly two main directions can be distinguished: one is more concerned with the internal renewal of the Church, with Church structures, freedom of opinion, etc., the other with social justice, peace (conscientious objection), anti-capitalism, the battle against the outward power of the Church (particularly the Concordat). After years of uphill fighting many show signs of fatigue, some have become little house-churches, others have joined political parties. But their place is soon taken by others and today there is probably no parish in the country without one or more spontaneous groups.

By and large, the bishops prefer not to know that they are there and continue to ignore them as long as they don't make open gestures of dissent. There is something curiously schoolboyish in the bishops' shame of confessing to their colleagues, and above all to Rome, that their subjects are not all as docile as they should be, and in their disproportionate show of energy when they can no longer ignore them. In a recent TV program on Primo Mazzolari, one bishop said that he did his duty (and became a saint) by suffering what he did from the Church authorities. The tacit presupposition, that the authorities did their duty by making him suffer, was underlined by the thunderous applause which greeted Cardinal Florit at the first meeting of the Bishops' Conference after his clash with the Isolotto community.

If the official policy aimed at isolating and emarginating the groups, it did not succeed—so little indeed, that they are now, rightly, considered "the other Church" (the title of a book on the phenomenon, *L'altra chiesa in Italia*, Mondadori 1970). Not another Church, but the other side of the same Catholic Church, in many ways more authoritative and better equipped, culturally and politically, to meet the surrounding reality of the

country. Many groups are seriously engaged in the dialogue with Marxism, perhaps the most decisive for the future of the Church, but constantly eluded at the official level. And it is again at the level of the groups that the Protestant minority finds a possibility of wholehearted cooperation, rather than the benign condescension shown by the bishops. Significantly, the only serious attempt to reconcile Florit with the Isolotto Group was undertaken by an ecumenical congress at Camaldoli in 1969, at the proposal of the Protestant participants. And in December, 1971, the Protestant delegation to an ecumenical meeting withdrew after Cardinal Siri had refused to invite representatives of the Oregina community; they could not, they declared, participate in a celebration of Christian love where one Christian refused to sit at the same table with brothers of his own Church.

It is precisely this challenge of Christian love which must be met by the Church, at a moment when the gravest danger consists in an ever growing polarization. Though often rebuffed and disappointed, the groups on the whole continue to love the Church and want to belong to it. There is even something pathetic in the way, e.g., the Isolotto community continued to beg Cardinal Florit to come and talk to them, long after it had become clear that he had no intention to do so. Most would still subscribe to the declaration of a group of Piedmontese priests and laymen: "We do not consider ourselves as living at the margin of the Church, nor do we intend, because of a fundamental necessity of Church communion, to make substantial ruptures, even if at times we may be forced to take decisions which are in contrast with the official ones."

But the bishops would do well to recognize this love, before it is too late. There is a limit to the frustrations that may be imposed on individuals and groups, and in some cases this limit has been reached. If the bishops continue to prefer passive obedience or indifference to the critical love of their most vital communities, they may become themselves the cause of those "substantial ruptures" the groups want to avoid—with disastrous results for the renewal of the Italian Church.

The experience of these ten years after the beginning of the Council seems to confirm the truth of the words of Ignazio Silone which I have quoted at the beginning of this article. They indicate the danger of division, but they also contain the one great hope of the Italian Church. We will continue to wonder "where Pope John came from"—but there is no doubt that, apart from his personal charisma, he was at the same time wholly and typically a product of this Church. The mysterious undercurrent of extraordinary vitality, which was revealed by his sudden appearance, is not yet exhausted. It may yet prove strong enough to break the dikes which official *prudenza* has built in the ten years after the emergency.

THE SCREEN

As it is used in the title *Up the Sandbox*, the word "up" appears to be a revolutionary war cry. But whatever imaginative act of liberation may have been intended, the film that has been made from Anne Roiphe's novel seems to remain a slave to female guilt and self-doubt. Mirroring the life that she was living at the time she wrote it, Ms. Roiphe's novel is about a woman named Margaret, the wife of a college teacher living on the upper west side of Manhattan. Margaret's husband neglects and unbraids her by turns. Her housework overwhelms her. Her social life bores her. Her new pregnancy disturbs her. No wonder she's unhappy.

But in Margaret's fantasies and daydreams it is revealed that the real woman's struggle is against woman herself. If the dreaming Margaret isn't blowing up the Statue of Liberty, that arch symbol of matriarchy, she is having a fistfight with her mother. If she isn't fantasizing her own demise at the hands of African amazons, she's wondering whether it isn't her husband's mistress, rather than her husband, that she should confront about his infidelity. When she envisions a debate between herself and Fidel Castro, last bastion of *machismo* that he is, even Fidel turns out to be a woman, a lesbian transvestite on the make.

Since Barbra Streisand's legend belies her performance here, she was perhaps not a very good choice to play Margaret. What holds Margaret back more than anything else is her feeling that she is just a sweet American *Mädchen* with nothing to offer. But Ms. Streisand is super-*Mädchen*, the girl with nothing to offer—weird looks, fractured voice, no class—who parlayed it into stardom. Ms. Streisand proves that Second-Hand Rose can score, which is the one thing that Margaret disbelieves and that Ms. Roiphe wants secretly, desperately, to persuade us isn't so. Unlike the subversive Ms. Roiphe, director Irvin Kershner seems unsure what he's trying to persuade us of. His direction and editing suggest he was even unsure where Margaret's reality ends and her hallucinations begin. I guess she's just another hysterical woman to him. The one person who seems to be working comfortably within his limits on this film is scripwriter Paul Zindel. As author of the play *Man-in-the-Moon Marigolds*, Zindel showed that he feels right at home with hysterical women.

If *Jules and Jim* were to commit adultery with *A Man and a Woman*, Claude Sautet's *Cesar and Rosalie* would be the illegitimate offspring. Sautet's characters are Truffaut's characters with pimples—a puerile reissue of the Truffaut triangle, a second generation corrupted by

the commercial influence of the maternal (Lelouch) line. Cesar (Yves Montand) is a self-made, millionaire junkman, but—to shift analogies for the moment—his Rosalie (Romy Schneider) wasn't born yesterday. She is a cosmopolitan young lady who imposes order on Cesar's business affairs, coaches him in culture and hangs out with artists.

What Sautet himself does, though, is not so much art as caricature. The other man in Rosalie's life is a syndicated cartoonist, David (Sami Frey), who sees Cesar as a brash gangster type and even depicts him that way in his comic strip. Sautet's own idea of Cesar is not so different, just kinder and more sympathetic (as is David's by the end of the film). Where most directors have played Yves Montand for his good looks, even in comedies, to Sautet Montand looks funny. Sautet gets Montand to do some mugging here that reveals a new comic-grotesque side to his talents.

Nevertheless, it is neither Cesar nor Yves Montand who is ultimately being caricatured here: it is the unpredictable, indecisive sort of lovers that Truffaut introduced to moviegoers twelve years ago. *Cesar and Rosalie's* recipe is merely to take Truffaut's raw material and Sautet lightly.

In *Lolly-Madonna XXX* the Gutshalls and the Feathers present-day counterparts of the Hatfields and McCoys, engage in an internecine feud over some pasture land. It's the sort of movie whose makers hope that if they show you enough violence, they will get credit for trying to turn you against violence. As the Gutshalls and Feathers rape, stomp and shoot each other non-stop, the film's plot seems to be saying, "Oh, isn't this dreadful?" But the camera work keeps sneaking close-ups of the gore in uncontrollable fascination with it all. I can't imagine what Rod Steiger and Robert Ryan thought they saw in this script—especially Ryan, who once wrote me a letter deploring violence in movies. As for director Richard C. Sarafian and writers Rodney Carr-Smith and Sue Grafton, they probably think of themselves as moralists. Most hypocrites do.

John Wayne's latest film, *The Train Robbers*, is a little old wine trying to pretend it's in a new bottle. (That remark may sound a little cliché, but this *is* a John Wayne movie.) Wayne, Rod Taylor, Ben Johnson, et al. are hired by a poor widder lady (Ann-Margret) to help retrieve some money her dead husband stole. She wants to give it back to restore the family honor, and she is offering to split the reward with the men. After Wayne and the others "aw, ma gosh" and "gee willikers" through about ten reels, they nobly decide to let her turn in the recovered loot so she can have the whole reward for herself and her little boy. The credits on this film ought to include the acknowledgement, "Our special thanks to John Ford, without whose talent and

dedication this film could never have been made." Wayne hasn't learned anything new since Ford quit directing his films years ago. Burt Kennedy takes credit for being director here; but if Kennedy weren't putting Wayne through his paces this time, somebody else would be—probably Andrew J. McLaglen—and the paces would still be the same.

Of course, audiences today look at both life and movies with a more jaundiced eye than they did in Ford's time. In its last scene *The Train Robbers* makes

a slight concession to these fluctuations of popular taste. With Ann-Margret playing the widder lady, we should have suspected all along that something was wrong. Ann-Margret ain't exactly Joanne Dru. In that last scene Wayne discovers he's turned the money over to a hooker who has been working a con game on him. This ending is for the benefit of those people in the audience who can't believe what a sticky mess of refried beans this movie has been.

COLIN L. WESTERBECK, JR.

BOOKS

Shifted fig leaves and adolescent sex

Adolescent Sexuality in Contemporary America

ROBERT C. SORENSEN

World, \$20.

JOHN N. KOTRE

"Playboy," in the words of Rollo May, "has shifted the fig leaf from the genitals to the face." Not only *Playboy*, I would note, but researchers into sexuality as well. They have moved in for quantified close-ups of churning genitals (did you know that the male and female organs contract every 0.8 seconds during orgasm?), and they have amassed an impressive inventory of information on who does what to whom—and where—and how often. But for the most part sexologists have failed to take on the more difficult task of looking into the eyes of the one experiencing the action down below.

Robert Sorensen's study of adolescent sexuality is different in this regard. It is about the sexual experiences of the young and the meaning these experiences have for them. The bulk of his data comes from a national survey of 13-19-year-olds conducted in March and April of 1972, the questionnaires being self-administered under conditions of complete confidentiality. These data are supplemented by tape-recorded interviews with another 200 adolescent subjects.

I should make it clear at the outset that Sorensen's major sample is *not*—as he claims—representative of American adolescents. The details are arguable, but the point is that less than half the adolescents randomly selected and contacted actually completed a questionnaire. Parental consent for questionnaire administration could not be obtained for 40 percent of the original sample, and adolescent consent could not be received for another 14 percent. Adolescents who completed questionnaires, then, are representative of households where parent and child feel open enough to give information to an outsider about sex, and these households are about half of those in the country.

What, then, do the nation's "open" adolescents reveal about their sexuality?

Twenty-two percent say they are *sexually inexperienced*. That is, they have had no sexual contact, other than kissing, with another person. The inexperienced are younger than the experienced; they receive better grades in school; they describe themselves as more religious; and more of them are girls. Most say they have not had sex with another "because I'm not ready for it." Others have yet to meet the right person. The sexually inexperienced stress morality in sexual behavior more than others, yet they are not hostile or intolerant toward their experienced contemporaries. They do not

appear to be jealous of them, nor do they suffer from a lack of self-confidence or self-esteem. Only 30 percent, however, claim satisfaction with their sex lives (as compared with 80 percent of nonvirgins).

Sexual beginners—17 percent of Sorensen's sample—have engaged in one or more of three pre-intercourse activities (touching or being touched on the breast, the vagina, or the penis), but have not yet had intercourse itself. In another context they would be labeled "technical virgins." To no one's surprise, boys press for beginning sexual activity at an earlier age than do girls. Beginners refrain from intercourse, according to Sorensen, because they do not need it to obtain sexual satisfaction. "Intimacy, passion, and affection characterize many beginning relationships, and orgasm occurs for some adolescents in beginning sexual activities." Pressure on girls to avoid pregnancy is another reason for avoiding intercourse.

Sorensen observes that most adolescents do not tarry long at the beginning stage. They either move on to intercourse with the same partner or seek another partner. Those that do continue in pre-intercourse activities he labels "advanced sexual beginners." How many there are he cannot say, but they "have developed their sexual activities to a point of sophistication and imagination exceeding that of

30 March 1973: 90

many partners in sexual intercourse." As one 16-year-old said of his girl friend:

She once told me that I was too mature and sophisticated just to want to come into her so we could say that we had had intercourse. We both have our orgasms. She doesn't want to be a virgin because we're not married. She wants to be a virgin because she's having too much pleasure at this stage. I'm not going to urge it any different.

Fifty-two percent of the adolescents interviewed *have had intercourse* at least once. An eighth of these had intercourse by the time they were 12; about a quarter have had 7 or more intercourse partners. First intercourse is experienced quite differently by boys and girls. Boys rehearse it over and over again in their fantasies, but girls seldom plan ahead. Boys are more likely to say they were "excited," "thrilled," "happy," and "satisfied" about their first intercourse; but girls overwhelmingly report they were "afraid" and to a lesser extent acknowledge they felt "guilty," "worried," or "embarrassed." Most incisive are the findings about the adolescent's *perception of the other* during intercourse. Boys misperceive the girl's reaction entirely, thinking the experience was as satisfying to her as it was to themselves. Girls, on the other hand, are fairly accurate in their perception of the boy's positive reactions. Boys are less serious about their partners before intercourse and feel less involvement with them. They are less likely than girls to have intercourse with the same partner again. Sixty-seven percent of the males agree "I'm glad I did it when I did"; only 14% wish they had waited until they were older. Girls, on the other hand, are more prone to rationalize their first intercourse in terms of the affection they felt for their partner and the possibility of marriage. Only 54 percent agree "I'm glad I did it when I did"; and as many as 40 percent wish they had waited until they were older. Contraceptives are not

used in the majority of first intercourse encounters.

There are two major patterns of intercourse activity among nonvirgins: *serial monogamy* (practiced by 21 percent of the total sample) and *sexual adventurism* (engaged in by 15 percent). Serial monogamists are unmarried nonvirgins having a close sexual relationship with a single partner. Though both partners intend to be true to the relationship, it is of uncertain duration, and many monogamists enter into a series of such bonds over a period of years. Adventurers, on the other hand, seek many mates. Only one percent have had only one sex partner during adolescence, and nearly a third have had 16 or more. Monogamists are disproportionately female, adventurers predominantly male. The former seek and find—at least temporarily—closeness, love, and meaning in their sexual relationships; the latter do not. Adven-

turers are more technique-oriented, more willing to feign love to get intercourse, less bothered by conscience, and more in conflict with their parents.

Adolescents are not particularly careful to avoid pregnancy. Forty percent of the nonvirgin girls agree that "I don't really care whether or not I become pregnant," and the same percentage report that they did nothing to prevent pregnancy during their most recent intercourse. Three-fifths of the nonvirgin girls (and half the nonvirgin boys) would not want their pregnancy terminated "because taking the life of an unborn child is wrong." Of the nonvirgin girls, only a fifth would want an abortion in case of pregnancy and only seven percent would give their baby up for adoption. Most would prefer to bring the baby up with its father or even by themselves.


There is a great deal of such information in this book—all of it of value.

LOOK WHAT FIDES HAS FOR YOU!

A MAJOR NEW STUDY
BY THE WORLD
RENOWNED THEOLOGIAN

Bernard Häring MEDICAL ETHICS

A systematic and comprehensive reappraisal of the ethics of medical practice and research within the Roman Catholic tradition. The range of topics covered in this important book is very broad: abortion, contraception, artificial insemination, brain death, organ transplant, prolongation of life, euthanasia, health, illness, psychotherapy, homosexuality, drug addiction, alcoholism, professional secrecy of the physician, painless childbirth, experimentation with human beings, plastic surgery and suffering.



CLOTH \$8.95

Simultaneous editions in Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany and England.

At your bookstore or write:



FIDES PUBLISHERS, INC.

Dept C
Notre Dame, IN 46556

Commonweal: 91

Unfortunately, the quality of the write-up and interpretation varies considerably. The section of personal values, for example, is little more than a phone book of attitude statements to which X% agree and Y% disagree. And there is a tendency on the part of Sorensen—and also Bishop Paul Moore, who wrote the introduction—to idealize the adolescent. He or she is pictured as a noble savage, naively open to the beauty of sexuality, discovering intimacy and fulfillment despite the restrictions of parents and society. I respond as enthusiastically to the emerging sexuality of these young people, but I am equally disturbed by other themes in the data. To name just one: the kind of milieu described is one in which the word *owe* does not exist. No one can make a claim on anyone else. Even the “committed” monogamist can opt out of a relationship at a moment’s notice.

Read *Adolescent Sexuality in Contemporary America*—I do recommend it—as you would an issue of *Psychology Today* (Sorensen is a former editor of that magazine). Stick to the data and listen to what the adolescents say rather than to what a hurried Sorensen says they say.

For those concerned with the ethical dimension (there *are* others) of sexuality, this book is doubly valuable. First of all, it offers an amoral description of the phenomenon and thus provides the untainted data from which sound ethical analysis can proceed. It prevents one from altering his psychology to fit his morality, from saying, for example, that masturbation—being “selfish”—is a poor preparation for heterosexual activity. Sorensen’s data show the reverse: those who masturbate are also more likely to be heterosexually active. More important, the book moves our eyes from the act to the meaning behind the act. After studying this report, one cannot scale morality in terms of “What can I do?” or “How far can I go?” He must ask instead, “How do I regard this person?” The answer to the latter is less clear-cut, but searching for it does keep the fig-leaf off the face.

God Was Here but He Left Early

IRWIN SHAW

Arbor House, \$7.95

Museums and Women & Other Stories

JOHN UPDIKE

Knopf, \$6.95

ROBERT PHILLIPS

For some novelists the writing of short stories is purely diversion. (Think of E. M. Forster or Thomas Wolfe.) This is true of neither Irwin Shaw nor John Updike, whose stories represent a significant portion of their bodies of work. In confirmation, this season brings both Shaw’s and Updike’s sixth story collections. Neither repeats himself, but attempts to break new ground. Shaw fails where Updike succeeds, but both have been more impressive in earlier, more traditional modes.

Of the five pieces Shaw gathers here, three are long fantasies—departures from the realism of his fine early collections, *Tip on a Dead Jockey* and *Mixed Company*. Yet the two shorter, realistic stories are more successful. Of these the title story is first-rate Shaw. In a few pages he manages to record, through the pellucid consciousness of a female protagonist in search of an abortionist, an astonishing number of uses and abuses of the flesh and spirit. It is one of those stories which help the reader to come to terms not only with the world, but with himself.

The other shorter story, “Where All Things Wise and Fair Descend,” focuses on another vital occasion and has the potential to move us as forcefully as the first. Yet it is more pathetic, when its golden-boy protagonist has one encounter with a less favored being, and we are told we must believe he has come to comprehend that the capacity for sorrow is also the capacity for living. With this epiphany, Shaw tells us, his protagonist “wasn’t going to wake up, automatically feeling good, ever again.” Maybe. Somehow the reader is not convinced of the con-

version of Steve Dennicott. Perhaps if his own brother had been killed, and not a near-stranger, we would comprehend. As it stands, the public experience does not become a private one.

The three novellas which follow are concerned, as Shaw suggests, in a Preface, with “three of the major pre-occupations of our age—Science, Sport, and Sex.” What Shaw does not explain is that each of his male protagonists is more or less a modern Faust figure, embarking on a long search for fame, for power, for pleasure. One even admits to spending “a season in hell.”

In “Whispers in Bedlam” a professional football player discovers he can hear the opposing team in their huddle. The uncanny skill enables him to anticipate every play. As he leads his team to a winning streak, the material rewards America showers upon its heroes come his way. But he finds that his new success, which he had been able to rationalize as a God-given gift, begins to force him to lie, to compromise, and to feel a cheat. Realizing his new life to be compromised by the criminal profits of corruption, he renounces his “gift.” At the end of *Faust*, Part II, Goethe’s hero derives great satisfaction from reclaiming a swamp for humanity. At the end of Shaw’s story, the hero contentedly sells life insurance for his father-in-law.

And then? the reader might well ask, confronted with so familiar a plot. The story has immediacy, but it does not plummet to the bottom of the mind. It remains an anecdote, as does “The Mannichon Solution” (read “Manichaeism” and the dualities of the story become transparent, with yellow races versus the white) in which a researcher would more or less sell his soul for a Nobel Prize; and “Small Saturday,” in which a short bachelor is obsessed by tall women. It is no great pleasure to read stories whose outcomes are predictable from the outset—surely true of the latter and only a trifle less so of the former since Shaw, having achieved the expected, proceeds to tack on a second, O. Henry-type ending. Both recall the highly polished stories of Roald

Dahl. As entertainments, they suffice. (All three appeared in *Playboy: The Magazine of Entertainment for Men*.) As literature to which we might return to possess our own lives, they are curiously hollow. In this book Shaw is more concerned with the well-plotted fantasy than with psyches. Unlike Updike, Shaw has not passed from the observation of externals to a knowledge of or identification with the "I" of his desperate characters.

Updike's last collection, *Bech: A Book*, earned its subtitle. Like the *Prin* cycle of Nabokov and the *Fidelman* stories of Malamud, it possessed a near-novelistic unity. By contrast, *Museums and Women* is decidedly a collection, breaking into three groups and with material dating from 1956.

The first and best section, comprised of stories and sketches and impressions, attempts not so much what the jacket blurb writer has said, "to objectify the chimeras of middle-class existence" so much as to subjectify it. Unlike Shaw, Updike manages to assimilate the personal biases and emotional backgrounds of a gallery of characters: a professional photographer, a ski instructor, a church deacon, a pair of securities analysts, an old plumber. In the best stories Updike probes as deeply as that plumber, allowing the reader to comprehend that our lives, like the house in which the plumber practices his trade, are "a maze, a history, an archeology of pipes and cut-ins and traps and valves."

It is impossible to categorize Updike. Ever since he exploded the formal mode, in the concluding stories of *Pigeon Feathers* (1962), the book which remains his best collection, there has been for him no essential form. Like all true short story artists (as opposed to novelists), he accepts that his frame of reference can never be the totality of life, and therefore continuously selects particular points at which he can approach it. Perhaps this limitation partially "explains" the impetus behind the more experimental tales, pieces in which he explores life on the basic level of waterbugs and Dinosauria, finding in their behavior (or at least

inflicting upon it) a parallel to our "civilized" own. "The Hillies" and the title piece reveal Updike removing all episodic interest and, like the early Turgenev, replacing it with the static quality of a poem. Still others, "When Everyone Was Pregnant" and "The Cori" are near-essays in the style of the Mailer-esque new journalism. In his grave treatment of this latter piece of geography, Updike unconsciously echoes *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Our Town*, with his corner seen as "one among many on the map of the town, and the town . . . a dot on the map of the state, and the state a mere patch on the globe, and the globe insignificant from any of the stars overhead."

If the preceding seems overly portentous, the section designated "Other Modes" seems merely cute; Updike riding a two-wheeler on a high wire and shouting, *Look, Ma, no hands!* and the section devoted to "The Maples" suffers from the same condescension toward his "typical" couple, the same preoccupation with their couplings and uncouplings, which rendered *Couples* a bad book and *Rabbit Redux* much better but flawed.

No, after all the pyrotechnical displays, Updike seems best in the book's first section, where he is "merely" bringing off well-made short stories—a skill in which he has few contemporary equals. "The Deacon," for instance, a faithful portrait of a dedicated churchman who "wonders why he is there so often, how he slipped into this ceaseless round of men's suppers, of Christian Educational Committee meetings, choir rehearsals . . ." is Joycean in its epiphany. When the deacon attempts to rebel against his "meaningless" life pattern, he comes to confront the true purpose of his existence, the church. It is also a neat



REVIEWERS

JOHN N. KOTRE, author of *The View from the Border*, is on the faculty of the University of Michigan, Dearborn.

ROBERT PHILLIPS has published a collection of short stories, *The Land of Lost Content* (Vanguard).

Commonweal: 93

"Community can grow in the city"

PROFESSIONAL PROGRAM IN EDUCATIONAL AND PASTORAL MINISTRY Summer Session, '73

An Invitation to . . .

lay people
sisters
priests
seminarians

A New Way . . .

to listen to the voices of the city

An Integrated Experience . . .

in living in a city community
in learning through an inter-
disciplinary approach

Distinguished Planning Board includes . . .

Rev. Michael Groden, Director of
Urban Development, Archdiocese of Boston
Sr. Marie Augusta Neal, Sociology
Dept., Emmanuel College
Dr. Harvey Cox, Harvard School
of Divinity

The Options . . .

Master of Arts in Educational &
Pastoral Ministry
Certification in Educational &
Pastoral Ministry
Certificate in Advanced Educational
Specialization

Fees . . .

\$60 per course credit
\$45 per week, room & board
(special team rates)

For further information write:

Sister Helen Wright, Director
Summer Program in Educational &
Pastoral Ministry

EMMANUEL COLLEGE

400 The Fenway
Boston, Mass. 02115

parable on the nature of happiness, that evanescent commodity one does not know he possesses until he has relinquished it.

Other epiphanies, in "The Day of the Dying Rabbit" and "Man and Daughter in the Cold," work toward moments of recognition on the part of a middle-aged father. In one he sees that his children are both more callous and more considerate than he had assumed; in the other, that he is mortal, even more so than his daughter, whose

generation is jetting by. In "The Orphaned Swimming Pool" the author finds a potent symbol for the collapse of love in our time.

In these stories the implications of Updike's resonant writing resound in the reader's mind long after he has recovered from the emotional experience of reading them. Updike brings us to moments of wonder and allows the common reader to share with the author the excitement of the initial artistic intuition.



Steinfels (Cont.)

new "realism" at Bismarck's school. "It does not become the German," wrote Treitschke, "to repeat the commonplaces of the apostles of peace . . . or to shut his eyes to the cruel truth that we live in an age of war."

The tale, as you can see, is not only boring and useless, it is rather sad. The backbone of German liberalism, never much to boast about, was now broken for good. Bismarck was no Nazi; he accomplished his ends with a minimum of bloodshed, in a diplomatic performance which has been justly admired ever since. But the heritage he left Germany was one of submission to the strong and decisive leader, faith in power, cynicism about political principles, and contempt for public and parliamentary accountability. Brutality and force were rendered respectable, and adorned with a certain mystique. The opposition always cringed in fear of being branded disloyal. The results eventually were tragic for Germany, and for the rest of the world.

But the young people are right: none of this has anything to do with us.



CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 75)

Drinan overlooks in his description of "the good results of the definitive opinion of the Court" is that during the first trimester a woman may have an abortion performed anywhere, by anyone, "without regulation by the state" so long as she has the concurrence of her physician that the pregnancy should be terminated. So the non-physician and the delicensed physician have not been driven out of practice, but have been legitimated as professional abortionists, and may now become wealthy, respectable, and if all the projections carry through, medically necessary.

Father Drinan is correct that "physi-

Coming in April—

American Catholics in "An Uncertain, Anxious Time"

a major feature by

JOHN TRACY ELLIS

" . . . I WILL CENTER my comments in the main around two questions, and treat these with special reference to Catholic education: 1) How is one to explain the malaise that set in among the Catholics in this country about 1966? 2) What, conceivably, might be done to mitigate the confusion and doubt that have brought the nation's largest religious group of approximately 50,000,000 members, nigh one-fourth of the country's population, to such a low estate?"

Send for a Trial Subscription

----- 17 Issues for \$3 -----

FOR NEW SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

COMMONWEAL, 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016

Including the John Tracy Ellis issue, send the next 17 issues of Commonweal to:

Name

Address

City, State, Zip

☐ I prefer a full year subscription at \$14, with that issue.

3/30/73

30 March 1973: 94

cians . . . were given virtually exclusive jurisdiction over who will live and who will die during the first three months . . .," but they were also relieved of responsibility for the medical treatment that a woman may receive from the inept abortion practitioner. The Court could not have been more generous, nor more callous. After Blackmun's demythologization of the Hippocratic Oath, Drinan's assumption that the medical profession will establish ethical controls is naive at best.

The Court's opinion in *Wade* and *Bolton* does nothing to encourage confidence in the judiciary, and if Father Drinan's analysis of the opinion is an indication of legislative insight, there is little basis for hope.

Nonetheless, I do agree with Father Drinan's concluding paragraph. The role of those who believe in the inviolability of all human life will be different, and hopefully, more successful.

(REV. MSGR.) JAMES T. MCHUGH
Director, Family Life Bureau
United States Catholic Conference

Reply

I would raise three points about the contentions made by Msgr. McHugh:

1. My interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion on abortion does not appear to differ from that of John Noonan.

2. There is no evidence whatsoever in the Supreme Court opinion that, as Msgr. McHugh suggests, non-physicians or de-licensed physicians "have been legitimated as professional abortionists, and may now become wealthy, respectable, and . . . medically necessary."

3. My article did not assert the "assumption that the medical profession will establish ethical controls." I do, however, have the hope (which I am sure Msgr. McHugh shares) that the medical profession can be educated to the awesome responsibility which now is exclusively theirs.

ROBERT F. DRINAN
Member of Congress

Lest We Forget

San Francisco, Calif.

To the Editors: I am tempted to the sin of despair regarding what even the best history books will say about America's adventure in Vietnam, after reading your editorial in the February 9 issue, "After the Cease-Fire."

It is only to be expected that ordinary journalists would refer to "eight years of involvement," "a decade of war," etc. But I expected better of *Commonweal* than "American honor began to go with the first Kennedy equivocation about 'American advisers.'" That was no Kennedy, son; that was Eisenhower—or at least his government. Aside from all the treaty violations, the matériel being flown in when supposedly it was being removed, the Michigan State involvement, etc., the phrase "advisers" was definitely used ("Military Assistance Advisory Group") in regard to activities from December, 1960, to February, 1961. Granted this was a transition period from Eisenhower to Kennedy; but the records show that the policies and practices were firmly set in the Republican Administration, and the transition was smooth, not a change.

Perhaps this is nit-picking, but I don't believe it is. We must understand the years, particularly, from 1954 on (let alone the massive aid to France before that time) to get at the poisonous root of the involvement, and avoid its repetition. In essence we are back exactly where we started 18 years ago, except that the dead and maimed can't be rehabilitated. As Pablo Casals said about the Spanish Civil War: "Someone must remember—someone!"

Thanks for a great magazine.

VIRGINIA NEFF

Commonweal welcomes letters on subjects treated in its pages. Letters of not more than 250 or 300 words naturally have a better chance of being published.

Commonweal: 95

POP GOES JESUS!

The Jesus movement has prompted a multitude of responses on the part of church leaders—responses ranging from warm welcome to hostile rejection to a cautious and non-committal "wait-and-see."

POP GOES JESUS! critically examines this remarkable movement, this present-day phenomenon which has provoked such passionate argument and controversy. Every aspect of pop religion—open air festivals, street theatre groups, *God Rock*, Pentecostals, soul clinics, Christian communes, evangelistic God Squads—is brilliantly explored in this wide-ranging, hard-hitting, compulsively readable report.

Paperbound, \$1.95

Please send check with order to
MOREHOUSE-BARLOW
14 East 41st Street
New York 10017

Classified

RATES: 50c a word, one time; 48c, three times; 45c, seven times; 42c, thirteen times. Twelve words minimum. For box numbers add 50c per insertion. Classified payable with order; monthly in advance for more than three times. *COMMONWEAL*, 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Spanish

● **LEARN SPANISH IN MEXICO.** If you really want to learn Spanish intensively and economically, start any Monday at CIDOC. For catalog on language school and de-schooled academy, write: CIDOC, APDO 479, Cuernavaca, Mexico.

Institutes

● **BIBLICAL INSTITUTE, TRINITY COLLEGE,** Burlington, Vermont 05401. June 17-22. Vawter, Bright, Collins, Whealon, Sabourin, Jamieson. Write: Director.

● **INSTITUTE IN MARXIST THOUGHT.** June 25-July 13. Graduate Credit. Inquire: Oliva Blanchette, Director, BOSTON COLLEGE, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167.

Action

PEACE CORPS & VISTA NEED YOU
● Volunteer your skills & experience in developing 8 nations overseas and U.S. Join the universal struggle for human dignity—through education, skilled trades, agriculture, engineering, business, urban planning, medicine & other fields of community development. One or two years. Expenses paid—medical travel, vacation, living. Information: Bruce Mazzie.

ACTION
OCP Box 261, Washington, D.C. 20525

Pastoral

● **WORKSHOP: Skills and Attitudes for Adult Pastoral Planning and Development.** Information and Registration: Director of Continuing Education, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, Washington, D.C. 20017.

109 leading contenders for the 1973 NBA.

ARTS AND LETTERS

LEO BRAUDY—Jean Renoir: The World of His Films. *Doubleday*
ARLENE CROCE—The Fred Astaire & Ginger Rogers Book. *Outerbridge & Lazard*
STANLEY E. FISH—Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature. *Univ. of California Press*
MICHAEL GOLDMAN—Shakespeare and the Energies of Drama. *Princeton Univ. Press*
PAUL GOODMAN—Speaking and Language: Defense of Poetry. *Random House*
DANIEL HOFFMAN—Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe. *Doubleday*
ALBERT MURRAY—South to a Very Old Place. *McGraw-Hill*
LINDA NOCHLIN—Realism. *Penguin*
HAROLD ROSENBERG—The De-Definition of Art: Action Art to Pop to Earthworks. *Horizon Press*
LEO STEINBERG—Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art. *Oxford Univ. Press*
LIONEL TRILLING—Sincerity and Authenticity. *Harvard Univ. Press*
ALEC WILDER—American Popular Song: The Great Innovators, 1900-1950. *Oxford Univ. Press*
ARTHUR M. WILSON—Diderot. *Oxford Univ. Press*
VERNON YOUNG—On Film: Unpopular Essays on a Popular Art. *Quadrangle Books*

BIOGRAPHY

INGRID BENGIS—Combat in the Erogenous Zone. *Knopf*
HORTENSE CALISHER—Herself. *Arbor House*
KENNETH S. DAVIS—FDR: The Beckoning of Destiny, 1882-1928. *Putnam's*
LEON EDEL—Henry James: The Master, 1901-1916. *Lippincott*
ELEANOR FLEXNER—Mary Wollstonecraft: A Biography. *Coward, McCann & Geoghegan*
JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER—George Washington: Anguish and Farewell (1793-1799). *Little, Brown*
NIKKI GIOVANNI—Gemin: an extended biographical statement on my first twenty-five years of being a black poet. *Bobbs-Merrill*
JOHN HOUSEMAN—Run-Through: A Memoir. *Simon and Schuster*
DIANE JOHNSON—The True History of the First Mrs. Meredith and Other Lesser Lives. *Knopf*
GEORGE KENNAN—Memoirs, 1950-1963. *Atlantic/Little, Brown*
JOSEPH P. LASH—Eleanor: The Years Alone. *Norton*
MARGARET MEAD—Blackberry Winter: My Earlier Years. *Morrow*
PETER STANSKY & WILLIAM ABRAHAMS—The Unknown Orwell. *Knopf*

CHILDREN'S BOOKS

BETSY BYARS—The House of Wings (illus. by Daniel Schwartz). *Viking*
INGRI & EDGAR PARIN D'AULAIRE—Trolls. *Doubleday*
JEAN CRAIGHEAD GEORGE—Julie of the Wolves (illus. by John Schoenherr). *Harper & Row*
URSULA LE GUIN—The Farthest Shore (illus. by Gail Garraty). *Atheneum*
JULIUS LESTER—Long Journey Home: Stories from Black History. *Dial Press*
BETTY JEAN LIFTON & THOMAS C. FOX—Children of Vietnam (illus. by Thomas C. Fox with photographs). *Atheneum*
GEORGE MCHARGUE—The Impossible People: A History Natural and Unnatural of Beings Terrible and Wonderful (illus. by Frank Bozzo). *Holt, Rinehart & Winston*
ZILPHA KEATLEY SNYDER—The Witches of Worm (illus. by Alton Raible). *Atheneum*
WILLIAM STEIG—Dominic. *Farrar, Straus & Giroux*

CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS

MICHAEL BARONE, GRANT UJIFUSA & DOUGLAS MATTHEWS—The Almanac of American Politics: The Senators, the Representatives—Their Records, States and Districts—1972. *Gambit*
HERBERT BLOCK—Herblock's State of the Union. *Simon and Schuster*
LYNN EDEN—Crisis in Watertown: The Polarization of an American Community. *Univ. of Michigan Press*
FRANCES FITZGERALD—Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. *Atlantic/Little, Brown*
DAVID HALBERTSTAM—The Best and the Brightest. *Random House*
SEYMOUR HERSH—Cover-Up. *Random House*
STANLEY KARNOW—Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution. *Viking*
RICHARD SENNETT & JONATHAN COBB—The Hidden Injuries of Class. *Knopf*
COLIN M. TURNBULL—The Mountain People. *Simon and Schuster*
GARRY WILLS—Bare Ruined Choirs: Doubt, Prophecy and Radical Religion. *Doubleday*
Attica: The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica. *Praeger*

FICTION

JOHN BARTH—Chimera. *Random House*
BROCK BOWER—The Late Great Creature. *Atheneum*
ALAN FRIEDMAN—Hermaphrodite: The Autobiography of a Poet. *Knopf*
BARRY HANNAH—Geronimo Rex. *Viking*
GEORGE V. HIGGINS—The Friends of Eddie Coyle. *Knopf*
R. M. KOSTER—The Prince. *Morrow*
VLADIMIR NABOKOV—Transparent Things. *McGraw-Hill*
ISHMAEL REED—Mumbo Jumbo. *Doubleday*
THOMAS ROGERS—The Confessions of a Child of the Century. *Simon and Schuster*
ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER—Enemies, A Love Story. *Farrar, Straus & Giroux*
EUDORA WELTY—The Optimist's Daughter. *Random House*
JOHN WILLIAMS—Augustus. *Viking*

HISTORY

JAMES D. BARBER—Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. *Prentice-Hall*
JOHN P. DIGGINS—Mussolini and Fascism. *Princeton Univ. Press*
RICHARD DUNN—Sugar and Slaves. *Univ. of North Carolina Press*
LOREN R. GRAHAM—Science & Philosophy in the Soviet Union. *Knopf*
DAVID LOVEJOY—The Glorious Revolution in America. *Harper & Row*
JERRE MANGIONE—The Dream and the Deal: The Federal Writers' Project 1935-1943. *Little, Brown*
ROBERT M. MYERS—The Children of Pride. *Yale Univ. Press*
ROBERT O. PAXTON—Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944. *Knopf*
EDWARD E. RICE—Mao's Way. *Univ. of California Press*
ISAIAH TRUNK—Judenrat. *Macmillan*

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM—A Religious History of the American People. *Yale Univ. Press*
SILVANO ARIETI—The Will to be Human. *Quadrangle Books*
GERMAINE BRÉE—Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment. *Delacorte Press*
STANLEY CAVELL—The Senses of Walden: An Exploration of Thoreau's Masterpiece. *Viking*
WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN, JR.—Person and God in a Spanish Valley. *Seminor Press*
ARTHUR C. DANTO—Mysticism and Morality: Oriental Thought and Moral Philosophy. *Basic Books*

WILLIAM LEISS—The Domination of Nature. *Braziller*
THEODORE ROSZAK—Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society. *Doubleday*
MORTON WHITE—Science and Sentiment in America: Philosophical Thought from Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey. *Oxford Univ. Press*
THEODORE ZIOLKOWSKI—Theatrical Transfiguration of Jesus. *Princeton Univ. Press*

POETRY

A. R. AMMONS—Collected Poems: 1951-1971. *Norton*
W. H. AUDEN—Epistle to a Godson and Other Poems. *Random House*
JOHN BERRYMAN—Delusions, Etc. *Farrar, Straus & Giroux*
RICHARD EBERHART—Fields of Grace. *Oxford Univ. Press*
SAMUEL HAZO—Once for the Last Bandit: New and Previous Poems. *Univ. of Pittsburgh Press*
JOHN HOLLANDER—Town & Country Matters: Erotica & Satirica. *David R. Godine*
DENISE LEVERTOV—Footprints. *New Directions*
ARCHIBALD MACLEISH—The Human Season: Selected Poems 1926-1972. *Houghton, Mifflin*
JAMES MERRILL—Braving the Elements. *Atheneum*
FREDERICK MORGAN—A Book of Change. *Scribner*
ISHMAEL REED—Conjure. *Univ. of Massachusetts Press*
LOUIS SIMPSON—Adventures of the Letter I. *Harper & Row*

THE SCIENCES

JOHN E. BARDACH, JOHN H. RYTHER & WILLIAM O. McLARNEY—Aquaculture: The Farming and Husbandry of Freshwater and Marine Organisms. *Wiley*
HERMAN H. GOLDSTINE—The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann. *Viking*
GARRETT HARDIN—Exploring New Ethics for Survival: The Voyage of the Spaceship Beagle. *Viking*
MORRIS KLINE—Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times. *Oxford Univ. Press*
H. LEWIS MCKINNEY—Wallace and Natural Selection. *Yale Univ. Press*
PETER MATTHIESSEN & ELIOT PORTER—The Tree Where Man was Born/The African Experience. *E. P. Dutton*
VICTOR RICHARDS, M.D.—Cancer: The Wayward Cell. Its Origins, Nature and Treatment. *Univ. of California Press*
GEORGE B. SCHALLER—The Serengeti Lion: A Study of Predator-Prey Relations. *Univ. of Chicago Press*
ANN H. ZWINGER & BEATRICE E. WILLARD—Land Above the Trees: A Guide to American Alpine Tundra. *Harper & Row*

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATOR
LILY FEILER—Mayakovsky and his Circle, by Viktor Shklovsky. *Dodd, Mead*
MICHAEL GALLAGHER—Spring Snow, by Yukio Mishima. *Knopf*
RICHARD HOWARD—A Happy Death, by Albert Camus. *Knopf*
EDMUND KEELEY & PHILIP SHERRARD—Selected Poems, by C. P. Cavafy. *Princeton Univ. Press*
ISAAC KLEIN—The Book of Women: The Code of Maimonides, Book Four. *Yale Univ. Press*
ALLEN MANDELBAUM—The Aeneid of Virgil. *Univ. of California Press*
ELEANORE L. M. SCHMIDT—Studies on the Interior of Russia, by August von Haxthausen. *Univ. of Chicago Press*
VICTOR TERRAS—The Gambler, with Polina Suslova's Diary, by Fyodor Dostoevsky. *Univ. of Chicago Press*
MAY SWENSON—Windows and Stones: Selected Poems by Tomas Tranströmer. *Univ. of Pittsburgh Press*

Ten panels of judges have nominated these 109 books for the 24th National Book Awards. Only one winner will be named for each of the ten categories. The winners will be announced on April 10th. And on April 12th, at a ceremony in Alice Tully Hall at New York's Lincoln Center, each winning author will receive a prize of \$1,000 in recognition of outstanding achievement.



THE 24th ANNUAL NATIONAL BOOK AWARDS

The National Book Committee, a non-profit membership corporation, administers the Book Awards Programs on behalf of four donor organizations: the American Booksellers Association, the Association of American Publishers, the Children's Book Council, and the National Association of College Stores.